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Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful
Arts
CRAIG ALLEN NARD •

I. iNTRODUCTION
Patent law is about building fences. 1 The demarcation of one's proprietary
interest is facilitated by requiring the inventor, when filing a patent application, to
point out distinctly and with particularity what he regards as his invention. 2
Concomitant with this type of fence building are notions of certainty and
predictability. The prospect of certainty in the patentee's property interest has
several benefits, one of which is to create a sense of security which permits the
patentee to secure risk capital from investors, which in turn facilitates the
commercialization of the claimed invention. 3 A related benefit is the patentee's
ability to send a clearly defined message of deterrence to competitors, in effect
blocking them from developing the same or very similar technology. 4 This type of
certainty can be called "proprietary certainty." At the same time, it is important for
the public to be able to ascertain exactly where the patentee's property interest
begins and ends so that interested parties, namely competitors of the patentee, can

* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank
Charles Breeden, Joseph D. Kearney, and Kenneth Port for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this Article. I also wish to thank Michael Borovik and Adam Forman for their research
assistance.
1. In the late 19th century, the Commissioner of Patents wrote of the importance of claims
as "set[ting] definite walls and fences about the rights of the patentee." Charles Eliot Mitchell,
Birth and Growth ofthe American Patent System, in CENTENNIAL PROCEEDINGS OF TIIE UNITED
STA1ES PATENT SYsTEM 1891, at 43, 51 (Executive Comm. of the Patent Centennial Celebration
ed., 1990).
2. See 35 U.S. C. § 112 (1994) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention.").
3. Judge (then patent attorney) Giles Rich wrote a series of articles in 1942 exploring the
relationship between patent law and anti-trust law. He wrote of an inducement theory that "is by
far the greatest in practical importance." Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and
the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J.PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 159, 177 (1942)
[This theory] applies to the inventor but not solely to him, unless he is his own
capitalist. ... It might be called the inducement to risk an attempt to commercialize
the invention. It is the "business" aspect of the matter which is responsible for the
actual delivery of the invention into the hands of the public.
Jd. (emphasis added); see also Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir.)
("[E]ncouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant .... "),
modified, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
4. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Appropriability Conditions and Why Firms Patent and Why
They Do Not in the American Manufacturing Sector 17 (June 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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terminate wasteful "rent-seeking" behavior in the form of duplicative research, 5 and
commence efforts to either improve upon or design around the patented invention
without fear of reprisal. We can label this type of certainty "competitive certainty. " 6
Despite its importance, certainty has proven to be somewhat elusive in recent
years. There are essentially two reasons for this. First, as patented inventions are
described with words, part of certainty's elusive nature can be attributed to the
inherent ambiguity of language. 7 This ambiguity is especially acute in the world of
ideas as it is much more difficult to describe the particulars of an abstract concept
than it is the metes and bounds of Blackacre. It is not as if an inventor could post
a sign on the boundary of his inventive front yard reading: "Private Property. Keep
Out." The second reason for certainty's evasiveness is the generous exercise of
judicial discretion, particularly on the part of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"). 8 The Federal Circuit, which has exclusive

5. Rent-seeking has been defined as ''the incentive to overproduce goods that promise a return
greater than the cost of production (that is, an economic 'rent'), and to the resulting waste when
rents are transformed, through competition to obtain them, into costs." RICHARD A. PoSNER, LAW
AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 342 (1988) (parenthetical in original); see also
Michael A. Sartori, An Economic Incentives Analysis of the Jury's Role in Patent Litigation, 79
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 331,339 (1997).
Rent seeking occurs when innovators vie for the right to exclude and thereby
compete for the ability to collect the economic rent. Rent seeking is deemed socially
wasteful because in the "race for the patenf' innovators spend more economic
resources than is economically justifiable. Economic resources are wasted in research
and development by competitors in the patent race duplicating investments and in
patent litigation over issued patents.
!d. (citations omitted).
6. Although courts often speak of the patentee's ability to exclude "others" from making and
using his invention and the "public's" need to know of its rights and limitations with respect to the
patent grant, it is the competitors (i.e., persons ofordinacy skill in the art) ofthe patentee whose
interest is most immediately affected. Thus, I chose the term "competitive certainty'' instead of, for
example, "societal certainty." See Giles S. Rich, Foreword to DONALDS. CHISUM ET AL.,
PRINciPLES OF PATENT LAw iii (1998) ("The power of the federal courts is made available to
patentees for the enforcement of this right to exclude others. Who are these 'others'? Competitors,
of course.") (emphasis in original).
7.See, e.g.,Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,396 (Ct. CL 1967)("The
vecy nature of words would make a clear and unambiguous [patent] claim a rare occurrence.").
See generally RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAxis (1983).
8. Others have written about the Federal Circuit's excessive discretion as it relates to the onsale bar and the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The
Doctrine ofEquivalents in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. P A.
L. REv. 673, 682 (1989) ("The doctrine of equivalents is the primacy ... cause ofthe current
uncertsinty surrounding the scope of patent claims."); Joseph F. Hagg, Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co.: An Equitable Solution to the Uncertainty Behind the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1511, 1512 (1996) ("[The doctrine of equivalents] creates
uncertainty for competitors as to what will or will not infringe a patent"); Thomas K. Landcy,
Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine ofEquivalents, and
Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1159 (1994) ("On sale doctrine
is fraught with uncertainty and demonstrates the consequences of a failure to recognize the value
of having a rule."); Victoria Slind-Flor,Federal Circuit Judged Flawed, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 1998,
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subject matter jurisdiction over actions "arising under any Act of Congress relating
to patents,"9 employs the broad de novo standard of review when engaging in claim
interpretation 10 and patent validity determinations, 11 thus permitting the court to
second guess both the federal district courts 12 and the Patent and Trademark Office
("PT0"). 13 As a result, the all-important notice function of the patent claim 14 has

at AI.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994); see also id. § 1295(a)(1) (conferring exclusive jurisdiction
on the federal circuit for appeals from the district courts on claims under§ 1338).
10. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane).
11.See Pfaffv. WellsEiecs.,Inc., 124 F.3d 1429, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[B]oth on-sale and
obviousness detenninations are questions of law that we review de novo .... "); Richardson-Vicks
Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("It is black letter law that the ultimate
question of obviousness is a question of law. And we review that legal question without deference
to the trial court."); A via Group Int'l, Inc. v. LA Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1561-62
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating patent "[v]alidity is a question oflaw"); Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Bay
Area Rapid Transit Sys., 804 F.2d 659, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating the question of whether the
specification is enabling is a question oflaw to be reviewed de novo).
12. See, e.g., Exxon Chern. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1556 (Fed. CiL
1995) (asserting that the court has the authority to "review the issue of claim interpretation
independently without deference to the trial judge'').
13. Even though a patent is presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. IT 1996), a
persuasive argument can be made that the presumption is procedural in nature, not substantive.
See Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The
presumption of validity under§ 282 is a procedural device, placing the burden of proving invalidity
on the party asserting it. It is not substantive law.''). As such, the presumption does not translate
into substantive agency deference. See Solder Removal Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
582 F.2d 628,633 & n.lO (C.C.P A 1978) ("Application of§ 282 in its entirety has suffered from
analogy of the presumption itself to the deference due administrative agencies.''). In the end,
although stating that "[d]eference is due the Patent and Trademark Office decision to issue the
patent with respect to evidence" that it considered, American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons,
Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court is anything but deferential to the PTO, see,
e.g. ,In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998)(en bane)(holding that the Administrative
Procedure Act's deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review does not apply to the
PTO's factual determinations, rather, the clearly erroneous standard applies); In re Napier, 55 F.3d
610,613 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
It is well established that the ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of
law, which we review without deference to the Board's [(i.e., Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences)] judgment. Therefore, it is our responsibility to make the
final conclusion based on our reading of the record before us ....
I d. (citation omitted); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Traditionally
we have recited our standard of review to be, with regard to questions of law, that review is
without deference to the views of the agency ... .'').
14. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17,33 (1997) (stating that
"claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a notice function''); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S.
419, 424 (1891) ("The object of the patent law in requiring the patentee [to distinctly claim his
inven1ion] is not only to secure to him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what
is still open to them.''); Exxon Chern. Patents, 64 F.3d at 1563 (Plager, J., concurring) ("The
public generally, and in particular, the patentee's competitors are entitled to clear and specific
notice of what the inventor claims as his inven1ion.''); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948,
951 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating the purpose of claims is "putting competitors on notice of the scope
of the claimed invention''); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
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been greatly diminished, despite the court's frequent assertions that the patent claim
defmes the patentee's property interest. 15 I am not necessarily suggesting that the
English language is more accessible to a district court or the PTO; 16 rather, my
point is institutional and temporal in nature in that by the time the question of
validity reaches an Article III appellate (or even district) court it may be too late in
terms of strategic business planning, commercial decisionmaking, and litigation
costs. 17 In short, patent owners, their competitors, and the public are being ill-.
served by not having resolution of proprietary and competitive certainty until so late
in the "sterile enterprise of litigation." 18

1991) (Wbat''the patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office have agreed constitute the metes
and bounds of the claimed invention. Notice permits other parties to avoid actions which infringe
the patent and to design around the patent.").
15.See, e.g., Hoechst-Roussel Pharm. v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 756, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he
claims define the patent owner's property rights .... "); Beny Sterling Corp. v. Pescor Plastics,
Inc., 122 F.2d 1452, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("A properly conducted patent analysis, be it for
infringement or validity, necessarily requires construing the patent, and more specifically, the
claim."); General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
('"It is to the claims of every patent ... that we must turn when we are seeking to determine what
the invention is, the exclusive use ofwhich is given to the inventor by the grant provided for in the
statute,-''He can claim nothing beyond them."'") (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917) (omission added) (quoting in turn Keystone
Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274 (1877))) .
16. Although, the PTO does have technical expertise and is presumably more familiar with the
various technological practices. Every patent examiner possesses a technical undergraduate degree
and many have doctorates in their respective disciplines. The examiners must also graduate from
the Patent Academy; and the judges sitting on the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences are,
as required by statute, not only technically proficient, but have law degrees as well. See 35 U.S. C.
§ 7(a) (1994). See generally Harold C. Wegner, Patent Simplification Sans Patent Fraud, 20
AIPIAQ.J. 211,218 (1992)("Thenewpatentexaminer of the 1990's comes to the PTO in many
ways a step ahead of his or her counterpart from twenty-five years ago. In biotechnology, for
example, the typical new examiner probably has an advanced degree, and many have Ph.D's.").
17. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Radar, J.,
dissenting).
From [a} patent practitioner's standpoint, this court's enthusiastic assertion of its
unfettered review ... has the potential to undercut the benefits of Markman I.
Markman I potentially promised to supply early certainty about the meaning of a
patent claim. This certainty, in turn, would prompt early settlement of many, if not
most, patent suits. Once the parties know the meaning of the claims, they can predict
with some reliability the likelihood of a favorable judgment, factor in the economics
of the infringement, and arrive at a settlement to save the costs oflitigation.
Id (discussing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (A,farkman
/));see also Adelman & Francione, supra note 8, at-682 ("[U]ncertainty about the scope of patent
protection hinders both patent holders and;. potential defendants from assessing the possible
outcome of litigation or from making other business decisions .... ").
18. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Bryson, J.,
concurring). Indeed, sinee 1980, ''the number of[patent] cases coming to resolution at the District
Court level has risen in an almost linear fashion." Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Using Alternative Dispute
Resolution to Resolve Patent Litigation: A Survey ofPatent Litigators, 3 MARQ.lNTELL. PRoP.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 3, on file with author).
.
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A patent system, like any rights-based system, should seek to provide the players
operating within the system clearly defined guidance as to what is and is not
acceptable behavior. In our patent system, the patent claim is the principal
guidepost, the boundaries of which, importantly, should be established as early and
as clearly as possible. But, how is early certainty accomplished? There isn't much
one can do to combat the ambiguity oflanguage. We must accept it and work within
its framework. 19 On the other hand, judicial discretion is within our control. But
limitingjudicial discretion does not eliminate discretion entirely. That is, discretion
must reside at some level; the question is, where. One viable option is for the court
to repose a greater degree of trust in the PTO 's decisionmaking process. In this
vein, I have argued elsewhere that the Federal Circuit and district courts should
provide more deference to the patentability decisions of the PT0. 20 In order for this
to happen, however, the players in the patent game must have confidence in the
PTO's decisionmaking ability. The patent application process is a non-adversarial
ex parte proceeding. 21 As such, one can argue that excessive judicial discretion and
the lack of confidence of the patent bar (or at least some in the patent bar) in the
PTO are a result of the ex parte nature of the patent prosecution process/ 2 whereby
the PTO and the patent applicant enter into a contract with, almost invariably,
incomplete knowledge of extant prior art. 23 This ex ante knowledge problem has led

19. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that those who draft patent applications are helpless.
As a general matter, one can argue that patent litigation is, at least in part, a result of inept claim
drafting and myopic written descriptions. See, e.g., ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844
F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Nichols, J., dissenting). Referring to claim drafting, Judge
Nichols wrote in dissent that "(w]e are up against what we must realistically consider a growing
inability of speakers and writers, lawyers, technicians, and laymen, to say what they intend to say
with accuracy and clarity." I d.
20. See Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHJO ST.L.J. 1415
(1995) [hereinafter Nard, Deference, Defiance]; Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful
Arts, 10 HAR.v. J.L. & TECH. 510 (1997).
21. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-134 (1994). The patent code does provide for an adversarial inter
partes proceeding with respect to interferences (i.e., the process by which the PTO determines who
is entitled to a patent as between two or more patent applicants claiming the same subject matter).
See id. § 135.
22. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts,64N.Y.U.L.REv.1,21 (1989).
[T]he courts were properly influenced by the fact that patent prosecutions are largely
ex parte, with the applicant in a superior position to the PTO examiner with respect
to the information needed to determine patentability. Perhaps fearing that they lacked
the tools to control the quality of operations within the PTO, and that therefore
patents were sometimes improvidently granted, the regional circuits gave little
deference to its decisions.
Id.; Lorenz v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 305 F2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1962) ("This court has recognized
the unavoidable obstacles to an accurate and impartial decision that are inherent in e;x parte
proceedings in the patent office.").
23. See Gerald Sobel, Examining the Extra Burden Imposed on a Patentee Who Seeks a
Preliminary Injunction, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 985, 996 n,69 (1983) ("The allegations of
inadequacies in the ex parte process at the Patent Office derive from the view that the Patent Office
is deluged with applications and, accordingly, is unable to give full consideration to the prior art
references or to demand full disclosure of all relevant information in each proceeding."); infra text
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to the invalidation of patents several years after issuance based on prior art that was
not before the PTO. In fact, several empirical studies have shown that the chances
of invalidating a patent during litigation are considerably greater if the challenger
cites prior art that was not considered by the PTO. 24
This Article is concerned with how to fill this knowledge vacuum and restore the
patent claim to its rightful place. 25 As such, this Article proposes the
implementation of a post-grant opposition proceeding in the PTO wherein a third
party, in an inter partes setting, may challenge the issuance of a patent. 26 By
providing third parties with the opportunity to challenge the issuance of a patent,
an opposition proceeding would go a long way toward imposing proprietary and
competitive certainty ex ante. 27 While the suggestion that the United States adopt
an opposition proceeding is not novel, 28 the theoretical and empirical justificatory

accompanying notes 35-38.
24. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity ofLitigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998); see also GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INvALIDITY: A
STATISTICALANDSUBSTANTIVEANALYSIS § 5.05(4] (rev. ed. 1980) (examining 150 patents found
invalid from 1953 to 1967) ("[The] proportion of invalid patents wherein uncited prior art [(i.e.,
prior art not considered by the PTO during prosecution)] figured into the result is between 66 and
80 percent."). See also P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54,38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 233
(19 56), where Federico studied patent validity results during the years 1948-54 and found that
parties challenging the validity of patents during litigation had more success when they relied upon
prior art that was not considered by the PTO during prosecution.
25. I should make clear at this point that this Article does not set forth a theory of claim
interpretation. That project is for another day. What I do wish to address is how and why we can
provide the PTO and patent applicant with more information ("prior art") during patent
prosecution.
26. It is not my intention here to discuss the particulars of an opposition proceeding. The
Europeans and Japanese have opposition proceedings and the details of such can be gleaned rather
easily. My goal is to offer an economic and empirical justification for such a proceeding. For a
discussion of opposition proceedings in foreign countries, see Symposium, Opposition Systems,
4 AIPLA Q.J. 92, 104-321 (1976). See also RAPH LUNZER, SINGER: THE EUROPEAN PATENT
CONVENTION, 462-80 (rev. ed., Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 199 5); GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN
PATENT SYSTEM: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 188-231
(1992).
27. Patent applications are not publicly accessible. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994). Therefore,
with limited exceptions, third parties are unable to challenge the issuance of a patent. The
exceptions are "public use proceedings" and a "protest." These proceedings allow a third party to
submit to the PTO prior art or information about public use or on-sale activities and explain to the
PTO why a patent should not issue. With respect to a protest, the third party, after submitting the
prior art, is not permitted to communicate further with the PTO: A public use proceeding involves
briefing and testimony. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.291-.292 (1997). Needless to say, because patent
applications are held in confidence, protests and public use proceedings are rare.
28. In fact, a proposal for an opposition type proceeding in the United States can be traced back
to 1936. See Science Advisory Bd., Report ofthe Committee on the Relation ofthe Patent System
to the Stimulation ofNew Industries, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'¥ 94,97-99 (1936). In 1995~96, the
American Intellectual Property Law Association and the Intellectual Property Section of the
American Bar Association adopted resolutions which recommended that the United States
implement an opposition proceeding. Professor Harold Wegner has also been an outspoken
advocate of an opposition proceeding. Harold C. Wegner, Patent Law Simplification and the
Geneva Convention, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 154,200-01 (1986); Wegner, supra note 16, at 220. For a
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foundations that I explore in this Article have not, to my knowledge, been discussed
in the context of administrative procedure.
Thus, it is time we take a fresh look at the opposition proceeding, especially in
the light of (1) recent legislative attempts that would compel the PTO to publish
patent applications eighteen months after the application is flied/ 9 which some
. suspect is a precursor to the enactment of an opposition proceeding; (2) notable
empirical scholarship, particularly a recent study done by Paul Allison and Mark
Lemley, demonstrating that "most" of the prior art references cited during litigation
in support of invalidation are references that were not considered by the PTO
during prosecution, and in cases where patents were in fact invalidated, the party
challenging validity "disproportionately relied upon" prior art that was not
considered by the PT0; 30 and (3) an original empirical study that I conducted of
over 700 federal district court judges, the results of which demonstrate that the
number of judges who favor an opposition proceeding outnumber those who oppose
such by more than two to one. 31
I argue for the establishment of an opposition proceeding based upon both a
theoretical foundation and the aforementioned empirical studies. The theoretical
foundation is broken down into two components: (1) economic entitlement theory; 32
and (2) contract theory. 33 With respect to the former, the attractiveness of an
opposition proceeding is apparent when one considers that patent rights are best
viewed as property rule entitlements. Early certainty and a strong property rule
(with the power of the injunction in its remedial arsenal) go hand in hand, as a sense
of security in one's property interest is fundamental. An opposition proceeding
breeds intimacy with the claimed invention and will facilitate greater accuracy in
private valuation because, as the prior art picture becomes more complete during
prosecution, the more informed the parties will be with respect to the boundaries

discussion of the various administrative proposals in American patent law that have been made
throughout the years, see Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexaminah"on: Toward a Viable
Administrative Revocah"on System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HAR.v. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997); Allen

· M Soobert,Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition
for Opposition-and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63 (1998).
29. Section 202 of Senate Bill507 would amend 35 U.S.C. § 122 to read, "[E)ach application
for patent ... shall be published, in accordance with procedures determined by the Commissioner,
as soon as possible after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for
which a benefit is sought under this title." SeeS. 507, 105th Con g. § 202 (1997) (Although Senate
Bill507wastabledin 1998, it will most likely be reintroduced in 1999.); see also THE .ADVISORY
COiviMISSION ONPA1ENT LAWRE.FORM:AREPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 61-62 (Aug.
1992).
'
30. Allison & Lemley, supra note 24, at 233.
31. See infra Appendix. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, federal district courts have "original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to p11tents, plant variety
protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the
states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).
32. See infra Part ll.
33. See infra Part ill.
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of the claimed invention. 34 In short, prior art furnishes the bricks for the patentee's
fence.
Once it is understood that a patent is best viewed as a property rule entitlement,
we must next examine when and under what circumstances this entitlement may be
invalidated. This brings us to the second aspect of my theoretical
foundation-consensual contract theory. Freedom of contract is firmly embedded
in American jurisprudence. Generally, freedom of contract can be broken down into
freedom to contract and, more importantly, freedomfrom contract_3 5 The latter
"holds that transfers of property rights [(e.g., a patent)] shouid not be imposed upon
them without their consent."36 To put this concept in the context of patent law, the
process whereby one obtains a patent is comparable to a contract negotiation
between the patent applicant and the PTO, as representative of the public, including
the patent applicant's competitors. 37 Consider the following simple example:
A patent applicant conducts a prior art search and submits his findings to the
PTO, which also conducts a search. The PTO initially rejects the applicant's

34. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. ofAmerica v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. CL 1967) ("In
its broader use as source material, the prior art cited in the file wrapper gives clues as to what the
claims do not cover."); Vrtronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("[P]rior art can often help to demonstrate how a disputed term is used by those skilled in the art.").
35. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound ofSilence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REv. 821,840 (1992).
36. !d. at 841.
37. As one court explained:
A patent is a contract between the inventor and the public, the terms of which are
formulated by the United States Patent Office. The inventor in such a contract gives
as a consideration to the public a new and useful art, machine or composition of
matter, and, in return, the public gives as a consideration to the inventor. a monopoly
expressed by the claims of the patent of a period limited by statute to 17 years [(now
20 years from date of filing)), after which such monopoly expires and becomes
dedicated to the public.
Davis Airfoils, Inc. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 350,352 (Ct. CL 1954); see also Fried. Krupp
Aktien-Gesellschaft v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 F. 588,594 (3d Cir. 1911).
[A]nArnerican patent is a written contract between an inventor and the government.
This contract consists of mutual, interrelated considerations moving from each party
to the other for such contract. The consideration given on the part of the inventor to
the government is the disclosure of his invention in such plain and full terms that any
one skilled in the art to which it appertains may practice it. The consideration on the
part of the government given to the patentee for such disclosure is a monopoly for
17 years [(now 20 years from date of filing)] of the invention disclosed to the extent
of the claims allowed in the patent.
ld.; see also 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THELAWOFPATENTS 23-24 (1890).
The right of the inventor to his exclusive privilege, in return for the benefit cmiferred
by him upon the public, being once conceded, the idea that his letters-patent created
a contract between him and the people naturally followed. This idea seems to have
been firsi: suggested by Lord Eldon who, in a case decided in AD. 1800, stated that
a patent was a bargain with the public and was to be construed on the same
principles of good faith by which all other contracts were controlled.
Id It should be noted the Federal Circuit has also suggested that a patent is comparable to a statute.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,985-87 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
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claimed invention based on some of the prior art references. After amending his
patent application (e.g., narrowing some of his patent claims), the patent is
granted. Several years later, during litigation, the patent is invalidated by an
Article III court based on prior art not considered by the PTO.

Can one arg\Je that to invalidate the patent is to deny the patentee freedom from
contract? That is, the invalidating prior art was never part of the original bargain,
and to invai.idate the patent ex post is an imposition of unbargained for contractual
terms ultimately leading to the transfer (i.e., invalidation) to the public domain of
the patentee's property interest without his consent. If the patentee were aware of
the prior art, he would likely have bargained around it by amending his claims or
perhaps a patent would not have issued at all. At the same time, however, we must
recognize that an equal injustice would be visited upon the public, particularly the
patentee's competitors, if the court did not invalidate patents that never should have
issued. Thus, there exist competing policy concerns. The question is: To what
extent can an opposition proceeding address this dilemma?
All contracts are incomplete to a certain extent. This incompleteness is due
largely to a lack of knowledge ex ante. W~th respect to patent prosecution, this lack
of knowledge is in the form of undiscovered prior art. An opposition proceeding is
a way to enhance the information base of a patentability determination by allowing
thjrd parties to submit to the PTO material prior art. Such a proceeding recognizes
the localized nature of technical .information, information that is, for all practical
purposes, inaccessible. 38 By enhancing the amount of technical information before
the PTO during patent prosecution, not only will there likely be greater proprietary
and competitive certainty ex ante, but, the resulting patent claims will more
accurately reflect the consent of the parties.
Early certainty brought about by an opposition proceeding will (1) provide the
patentee with a greater degree of proprietary security, which in turn will facilitate
the commercialization of the claimed invention; and (2) spur the patentee's
competitors (i.e., persons of ordinary skill in the art) to either (a) enter into
informed licensing negotiations with the patentee (both the patentee, armed with a
potential injunction, and his competitors will be informed negotiators, which may
have the effect of reducing transaction costs associated with licensing thereby
encouraging the parties to reach an agreement); 39 (b) attempt to improve upon the
patented invention; 40 or (c) design around the patented invention. 41 With respect to
(b) and (c) in particular, the competitor, having competitive certainty ex ante (or
at least knowledge that a patent may issue), may terminate wasteful duplicative

38. See infra notes 123-31.
39.SeeKenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings ofPatentLaw, 23 J.LEGAL STUD.
24 7, 256 (1994 ). Of course, transaction costs will still be somewhat of an obstacle, but one can
argue that, with an opposition proceeding in place coupled with a property rule entitlement, such
costs would pose less of a burden on the parties to the transaction. This is primarily due to the early
notice function of publication and the familiarity that the parties will have with respect to the value
of the claimed invention. In that regard, a property rule, as opposed to a liability rule, strengthened
by an opposition proceeding permits the parties involved, not the state, to assess the value of the
patent.
40. See infra Part IVA
41. See infra Part IV.B.
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research efforts 42 and proceed to improve upon or design around the claimed
invention with a significantly reduced amount of fear that usually accompanies such
efforts. 43 In addition, the patentee is likely to be somewhat less apprehensive about
the validity of its patent and the prospect of a court determined damage assessment.
In contrast, .faced with a liability rule and uncertainty, competitors may opt to
infringe and pay later, most likely an amount that undercompensates the patentee;
or, fearful of standing upon shoulders greased by uncertainty, channel their
inventive energies to an unrelated technological field. 44
In addition to the theoretical justification for an opposition proceeding, there are
two empirical justifications. First, Lemley and Allison have shown that (1) "most"
of the prior art references asserted during litigation in support of invalidation are
references that were not considered by the PTO during prosecution; (2) in cases
where patents were in fact invalidated, the party challenging validity
"disproportionately relied upon" art that was not considered by the PTO; and (3)
"[t]he probability of invalidity based on uncited art was 40.8%, while the
probability of invalidity based on cited art was 29.6%." 45 Allison and Lemley
conclude that their data "indicat<( with a fair degree of confidence that reliance on

42. See Dam, supra note 39, at 264.
The patent issuance system itself has the effect of transmitting knowledge that a new
patent has been issued and that, the scope of the invention having been captured, R
& D of other firms can be terminated ....
. . . [R]ules favoring early applications for patents tend to reduce rent seeking by
inducing early elimination or redirection ofR & D by rival firms on issuance.
[d.; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN.
265,269-70 (1977).
43. With respect to an improver, the prospect of a secure patent is essential as it arms him with
much needed bargaining power. The reason for this is that an improver is usually also an infringer,
and without a patent, he is an infringer without bargaining power. At least with a patent, the
improver can presumably offer the original patent holder something of value with an eye towards
a cross-licensing arrangement See infra notes 148-49.
44. Indeed, a competitor will most likely visit his attorney before manufacturing a competing
product The attorney will study the claims of the patent and render advice accordingly. As Louis
Kaplow writes:
Uninformed individuals act based on their best guess about how the law will apply
to their contemplated conduct. Informed individuals act based on actual knowledge
of the law. Thus, informed individuals might be deterred from conduct they would
have undertaken ifthey had remained uninformed, which can occur when they learn
that such conduct is illegal or subject to a higher sanction than they otherwise would
have expected. Or, informed individuals might choose to undertake acts they would
have been deterred from committing if they had remained uninformed. Both
possibilities are of value to individuals. The value of advice, then, is simply the value
of each possibility weighted by the likelihood of its occurrence.
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
45. Allison & Lemley, supra note 24, at 234. The probability of an invalidity figure (29.6%)
for prior art considered by the PTO is also high, suggesting that Article III courts are employing
a broad standard of review. See Nard, Deference, Defiance, supra note 20, at 1504.
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uncited art [(i.e., prior art not considered by the PTO)) was more likely to lead to
a fmding of invalidity than reliance on cited art. " 46
Second, I asked 726 federal district court judges whether or not they favored the
implementation of a post-grant opposition proceeding. 47 Of the 726 judges
surveyed, 204 (or 28%) responded. Of the 204 judges who responded, 93 (or 46%)
favored the implementation of a post-grant opposition proceeding. 48 Forty-five (or
22%) disfavored such a proceeding, and 66 (or 32%) had no opinion. A majority
of the judges who favored an opposition proceeding cited diminution in litigation
and conservation of judicial/client resources as reasons for their position. Other
reasons given for supporting an opposition proceeding were institutional
competence and interpretive assistance in terms of patentability determinations,
generally, and claim construction, specifically. With respect to those judges who
disfavored an opposition proceeding, 49 their primary concern was the potential for
abusive and dilatory tactics on the part of the opposers as well as the somewhat
related notion of increasing the level of administrative procedural complexity. The
judges who gave no opinion indicated that they lacked patent law experience and
were ill-informed on the issue. 5°
In Part II of this Article, I explore the economic literature pertaining to legal
entitlement theory as applied to the patent right. I discuss, initially, why an
entitlement is needed, and then proceed to ask whether patent rights are best viewed
as property rule or liability rule entitlements. Having concluded, like others have, 5 1
that patent rights should be property rule entitlements, I explore in Part III notions
of contract theory, namely consent theory, and discuss why an opposition
proceeding fits nicely within a property rule framework. In Part IV, I address the
role of certainty and incentive in our patent system, particularly as certainty relates
to incentive-to-improve theory and incentive-to-design-around theory. Throughout
this discussion, one must keep in mind the underlying empirical foundation that
supports my theoretical argument for an opposition proceeding.
II.

PROPERTY RULES AND THE UsEFUL ARTs

A. Why an Exclusive Property Righi Is Needed
In his seminal work, R.H. Coase taught us that in a wor14 free of transaction costs
the initial allocation of legal entitlements is irrelevant in terms of efficiency as the
entitlement will wind up, through a voluntary transaction, in the hands of the party

46. Allison & Lemley, s11pra note 24, at 234.
47. See infra Appendix.
48. See infra notes 17.6-78 for representative responses.
49. See infra notes 181-83 for representative responses. '
50. See infra text accompanying note 174.
51. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter,An Economic Analysis ofDamages Rules
in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585 (1998)~ Robert P. Merges, Of
Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2655 (1994).
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who values it the most. 52 According to Coase, when externalities exist, 53 the
assignment of legal entitlements will have no effect on the use of the resource
because, when there are no transaction costs, the parties will come together and
optimally adjust resource use. The Coase Theorem, as it is known, is readily
applicable to intellectual property. 54 Consider the following example:
Inventor A patents a pharmaceutical drug XYZ and values this composition at
$100. Competitor B values the composition at $1,000 (perhaps B can make the
drug less expensively). Under the Coase Theorem, B's product will reach the
market irrespective ofwhefher A has a patent. If A does have a patent, B will
negotiate a license with A (somewhere between $101 and $999); if A does not
have a patent, a license is not necessary and B can simply produce and market
XYZ.

However, as Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed argued, "[f]or this to
hold, 'no transaction costs' must be understood extremely broadly as involving both
perfect knowledge and the absence of any impediments or costs of negotiating. " 55
In practice, of course, there are always transaction costs, as Coase himself
acknowledged. 56 This is particularly true in the world of patent law. Without a
proprietary interest, the transaction costs associated with excluding third parties
from profiting by one's inventive concept would be extremely high due to the free
rider problem, which in turn, would have an adverse impact on patent law's
incentive based dynamic. 5 7
For instance, an inventor without access to a patent faces what economists call
Arrow's Information Paradox. 58 Imagine the example of
a small inventor in a world without patents, tinkering away in a garage or
basement workshop before coming upon an invention with large commercial
potential. Imagine further that large capital investment is required before mass

52. R.H Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. &EcoN. l, 1-15 (1960); see also Robert
D. Cooter, Coase Theorem, in THE NEW PALGRAVB: A DICTIONARY OF EcoNOlvfiCS 457 (John
Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) ("[T]he Coase Theorem can be regarded as stating that the initial
allocation of legal entitlements does not matter from an efficiency perspective so long as the
transaction costs of exchange are nil.") (emphasis in original).
53. An externality may be defined as a cost or benefit imposed on a third party through actions
or transactions.
54. See JoHNW. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAw: LEGAL AND EcoNOlvfiC PRINciPLES § 2.04 (1995).
The implication of Coase' s theorem for information production is straightforward.
If the law permits users to use freely the information they learn from others, it will
be in the interest of users and producers to agree that the producer will make it and
users will pay him to do so. If the transaction costs are zero, those agreements will
lead to precisely the right amounts and types of information being produced.
I d.
55. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and

Inalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089, 1094-95 (1972).
56. See Coase, supra note 52, at 15 ("The argument has proceeded up to this point on the
assumption ... that there were no costs involved in carrying out market transactions. This is, of
course, a very unrealistic assumption.").
57. See infra notes 141-71.
58. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation ofResources for Invention,
in THERA1EAND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: EcoNOMIC AND SociAL FACTORS 609, 615
(Nat' I Bureau ofEcon. Researched., 1962).

1999]

FENCE BUILDING

771

production can be accomplished. Lacking this capital, and most likely the
experience and resources necessary to advertise, distribute, and sell large
quantities as well, the small inventor must fmd a buyer (or investor) for the
inventive concepts. Perhaps the inventor approaches the leading producer of
related products; or perhaps the inventor shops for venture capital by going doorto-door on Wall Street. Any potential buyer, of course, will not pay a high price,
or perhaps any price at all, unless sufficient details are disciosed. The inventor,
however, does not want to disclose too much, for fear the would"be buyer will
instead become an independent producer of the invention's commercial
embodiment, and a competitor of the true inventor.{5 ~ The inventor's paradox
may be solved by a patent, which gives the inventor the freedom to disclose
without fear of self-induced competition. 6lJ

Arrow's Information Paradox is due largely to certain features that are shared by
all fonns of information. Information or knowledge is a special type of economic
good often called a public good, 61 as distinct from so-called private goods. Public
goods have two characteristics: they are (1) inexhaustible and (2) nonexcludable.
A good is inexhaustible if consumption by one person does not leave any less of the
good to be consumed by others. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, in a letter to Isaac
McPherson, "He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening
me. " 62 In microeconomic terms, a good is inexhaustible if for any given level of
production, the marginal cost of providing it to an additional consumer is zero. A
good is nonexcludable if people cannot be excluded from consuming it. Without a
proprietary interest, for example, how does an inventor or poet exclude another
from using his idea or poem? The transaction costs associated with excluding or
negotiating with third parties are unbearable. 63
The two distinctive features of public goods-inexhaustibility and
nonexcludability-suggest that public goods will tend to be under produced, if
produced at all, by the market. Indeed, public goods present a special type of
problem called the free rider problem. If a public good is offered for sale,
consumers will have a strong incentive to under represent their personal value for

59. In discussing Arrow's Information Paradox, Robert Merges writes, "{T]o sell, one must
disclose the information, but once the information is disclosed, the recipient has it and need not buy
it. On the other hand, if one does not disclose anything the buyer has no idea what is for sale."
Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 81 (1994).
60. CinsUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 58 (parenthetical·in original).
61. In addition to information, other public goods include national defense, television signals,
and police protection.
62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS JEFFERSON
WRITINGS 1286, 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); see also Mark A Lemley, The
Economicsoflmprovementin Intellectiial Property Law, 75 TmcL.REv. 989,995 (1997) ("To
adapt an old parable, ifI give you a fish, I no longer have it, but ifl teach you to fish, you or I can
teach a hundred others the same skill without appreciably reducing its value.").
63. See ScHLICHER, supra note 54, § 2.05 (''With high transaction costs and bargaining
problems, it is unrealistic to expect ... agreements between producers and users of information to
correct adequately for externalities in information production.").
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the good, and thereby attempt to pay a low, or no, price for the good. 64 Consider the
example of a neighborhood watch pn:i'gram:
If a door-to-door collection is undertaken to raise money for the uniforms,
flashlights, and communication devices necessary for the program, each resident
will have the incentive to pay less than a simple pro-rata share knowing that he
will benefrt'rrom the program equally whether he pays or not. One can now see
why public. goods are viewed as a type of market failure.[ 65 ] To ensure that an
optimal amount of public goods are produced, governments typically intervene
in at least one of several wa.ys. P,._ government, funded with tax dollars, may
produce the good itself, as with police protection and national defense. A
government may also subsidize private production, as with biotechnology
research and deve1opment.[66] Alternatively, a government may attempt to create
a market.for the good by establishing new forms of property rights in things
related to the good. Patents are often considered to be one such form of
intervention. 67

B. Patent Rights as Property Rule Entitlements ·

With an understanding of why an entitlement is needed in the form of a patent, we
must now turn to the work of Calabresi and Melamed. 68 Whereas Coase taught us
that transaction costs determine who should own the legal entitlement, Calabresi
and Melamed explained why some legal entitlements should be protected by a
property rule and others by a liability rule. Calabresi and Melamed distinguish

64.See id.
The producer cannot guarantee that only users who are parties to the agreement will
have access to the information. The information may become available to nonparties. Each potential user may believe that enough other people will cooperate to
produce it without his help. He may decide not to contribute and hope to enjoy the
information for free. He will hold out and hope to free ride on the contribution of
others.
Id; see also FM SCHERER, INDusTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 444
(2d ed. 1980).
65. For an explanation of this statement, see OFFICE OF TECH. AsSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 (1992) [hereinafter TECH. AsSESSMENT REPORT].
Indeed, individuals have an incentive not to pay for the good, or to undervalue it, in hopes of
getting access as "free riders." The inability to exclude free riders distorts market signals and
is thought to result in inefficient allocation of resources to nonexclusive goods and
underproduction of them, relative to socially optimal quantities.
Id. For a more detailed discussion of public goods and the market failures associated with them,
see BRIANR BINGER& ELlzABE1HHOFFMAN, MicROECONOMICS WI1H CALCULUS 562-84 (2d ed.
1998); ROBERT D. CoOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 46-49, 108-12, 135-41
(1988); ROBERTS. PINDYCK & DANIELL. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 617-41 (2d ed. 1992).
66. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that instead of patents, the government should
aWard prizes to encourage invention. See Michael Polanvyi, Patent Refonn, 11 REv. EcoN. STUD.
61,65 (1944).
67. CHrsuMET AL., supra note 6, at 59; see also TECH. AssESSMENT REPORT, supra note 65,
at 185 ("In grantin,g a limited monopoly through copyright or patent, the government attempts to
compensate for distortions arising from nonexclusivity [of public goods].'').
68. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 55.
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between property rules and liability rules as ways to protect legal entitlements. A
property rule will permit a non-owner to appropriate the entitlement only if the nonowner first obtains permission from the entitlement holder. Thus, the entitlement
holder has the right to exclude and may keep his entitlement unless he voluntarily
decides to part with it. The classic property rule remedy or sanction is the
injunction. On the other hand, a liability rule entitlement permits a non-owner to
take the entitlement and thereafter compensate th:e entitlement holder if forced to
do so. Importantly, compensation under a liability rule is detepnined by the state
(e.g., a court or legislature) rather than the entitlement holder in a quasi-market
.
setting. 69
In the light of transaction costs and the desire to minimize s1,1ch, individual legal
systems must choose, for the most part, between a liability rule and a property rule
with an understanding of their respective consequences. 70 It has been argued that
in the absence of a holdout problem, property rules are preferred over liability
rules. 71 The primary concern with a liability rule pertains to valuation because the
entity charged with valuing the asset in question is the state: Thus, the risk of under
compensation is significant for no other reason than the state simply is not as
familiar with the asset as its owner. In the end, therefore, ".[t]he overarching
theme," according to Richard Epstein, "is to find that legal rule that minimizes the

69. According to Calabresi and Melamed:
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary
transaction in which the value ofthe entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. It is the
form of entitlement which gives rise to the least amount of state intervention: once
the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not tJy to decide its value. It
lets each ofthe parties say how much the entitlement is worth to him, and gives the
seller a veto if the buyer does not offer enough ....
Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an
objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule. This
value may be what it is thought the original holder of the entitlement would have
sold it for. But the holder's complaint that he would have demanded more will not
avail him once the objectively determined value is set. Obviomily, liability rules
involve an additional stage of state intervention: not only are entitlements protected,
but their transfer or destruction is allowed on the basis of a value determined by some
organ of the state rather than by the 1\arties themselves.
!d. at 1092 (footnote omitted).
70. See Richard A Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance ofProperty
Rules, 106 YALEL.J. 2091,2092 (1997) ("[O]ur world is not one in which transaction costs are
zero. Rather, they are positive and large, so that the choice between the two rules is certain to have
major consequences for the overall operation of any legal system.").
71. See id. at 2092 ("The standard practice in virtually all legal systems assumes the
dominance of property rules over liability rules, except under those circumstances where some
serious holdout problem is created because circumstances limit each side to a single trading
partner."). As a patent provides its owner with the right to exclude third parties from making,
using, or selling the patented invention, a holdout situation is a concern, particularly when a
competitor wishes to improve upon the claimed invention and needs to use the invention in its
research. See infra notes 147-49.
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sum of the costs associated with extraction and under compensation, the signature
risks of property rules and liability rules respectively.'m
This leads usto the following question: Are patent rights (or intellectual property
rights in general) best viewed as property rule or liability rule entitlements?
Initially, it should be noted that the foremost remedy available for a patent owner
is the injunction, 73 which has the effect of enticing the patentee and his competitors
to the bargaining table. 74 In this sense, a patent is a quintessential property rule
entitlement.
Furthermore, a strong argument can be made that patent rights are best viewed
as property rule entitlements 75 because of the difficulty the state has in accurately
valuing a patent, especially since a patented invention is unique (i.e., novel and
nonobvious). 76 According to Calabresi and Melamed, when transaction costs are
high and valuation is straightforward, a liability rule governs. In contrast, a property
rule applies where transaction costs are low (e. g., prospect of a holdout is low) and
valuation is difficult for the court. 77 In this regard, the patentee and his competitors
are more adept at valuati9n, particularly when competitor intimacy with the claimed
invention is facilitated by participation in an opposition proceeding.
However, one can argue that regardless of transaction costs, a property rule is
appropriate in the light of two fundamental economic theories of patent law, namely
the incentive-to-design-around and incentive-to-improve theories. 78 That is, despite
familiarity with the claimed invention, the patentee and a license-seeking
competitor may simply fail to come to terms. 79 In such a case, the competitor may
decide to design around the patented invention or, at the very least, improve upon

72. Epstein, supra note 70, at 2095.
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994).
74. See Dam, supra note 39, at 256.
[S]ince a patentee may seek an injunction, including a preliminary injunction pending
trial, the patentee will normally be able to bring an infringer to the bargaining table
where the parties will have an incentive to agree to license or even assign the patent
right to the infringer if he can more efficiently exploit the patent.

I d.
75. By suggesting that patent rights are best viewed as property rule entitlements, I am not
asserting what the breadth of claim scope should be for any given patent in terms of encouraging
optimal innovation. For competing views on optimal claim scope, see Kitch, supra note 42, at 265,
and Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics ofPatent Scope, 90
CoLUM. L. REv. 839 passim (1990).
76. See Merges, supra note 59, ai 78.
[A] property rule makes sense for patents because ... a court setting the terms of the
exchange would have a difficult time doing so quickly and cheaply, given the
specialized nature of the assets and the varied and complex business environments
in which the assets are deployed. Hence, the parties are left to make their own deal.

I d.
77. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 55, at 1106-10; see also Merges, supra note 51, at
2664.
78. See infra Parts IV.A, IV .B.
79. See infra notes 144-45.
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such. 80 By forcing the competitor's hand, so to speak, the progression of the useful
arts is well-served. 81 However, to design around or improve upon the claimed
invention effectively and efficiently, there must exist proprietary and competitive
certainty. A competitor, whether designing around or improving upon the claimed
invention, 82 must have confidence in where exactly the patentee built his fence so
that he can proceed accordingly and position himselfto avoid the potential sting of
a plausible infringement allegation. 83 This brings us again to the importance of an
opposition proceeding. The property rule entitlement in the form of a patent is
strengthened by an opposition proceeding because the more prior art references
(and accompanying arguments) that are considered by the PTO during prosecution,
the more proprietary and competitive certainty there will be ex ante with respect to ..
claim scope. 84 This is consistent with the all-important notice function of the patent
claim in a rights-based system. As Randy Barnett has stated:

80. In the context of collective rights organizations, it has been argued that in the face of high
transaction costs, there exist built-in mechanisms within a property rule system that allow the
parties to reduce transaction costs and allocate rights to the highest valued entity. See Robert P.
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1316-17 (1996); see also Merges, supra note 51, at 2655
r£PJroperty rules can and do work effectively in many situations involving [intellectual property
rights ("IPRs")]. This is so because, in the presence of high transaction costs, industry participants
have an incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs ofiPR exchange.").
81. See Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson, Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1532 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en bane) (Newman, J., concurring).
[Competitors of the patentee] may add technologic value in a variety of ways:
perhaps by developing a different path to the new markets opened by the patentee,
perhaps by adapting later-developed technology to enhance that of the patentee,
perhaps by perceiving alternatives and opportunities from a different perspective than
that of the patentee.

!d.
82. As will be discussed infra Part N A, an improver seeks to obtain a patent on his
improvement because his bargaining position vis avis the original patent owner will be greatly
enhanced. An improvement patent is the difference between being an infringer with bargaining
power and an infringer with considerably less bargaining power, if, for no other reason, an
improver without a patent faces Arrow's Information Paradox. See supra text accompanying notes
59-60. A competitor designing around a patent claim, on the other hand, seeks to avoid
infringement altogether. See infra text accompanying notes 150-53.
83. See Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A
Survey ofRecentLiterature, IO J.ECON. LITERATURE 1137, 1139 (1972).
Property rights assignments specifY the norms of behavior with respect to things that
each and every person must observe in his interactions with other persons, or bear
the cost for nonobservance .... The prevailing system of property rights in the
community can be described ... as the set of economic and social relations defining
the position of each individual with respect to the utilization of scarce resources.

!d.
84. As Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit has co-written, "[C]ited prior art fits. more logically

into the intrinsic evidence category. A list of prior art is in every file history. Thus, an argument can
be made that competitors are on notice and should be expected to review such before reaching any
conclusion as to claim scope." Honorable Paul R. Michel & Lisa Schneider, Vitronics-Some
Unanswered Questions, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at II 01, II 01.

776

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:759

The boundaries of individual discretion that are defmed by a system of clear
entitlements serve to allocate decision-making authority among individuals. Vital
infonp.ation is thereby conveyed to aU those who might wish to avoid disputes
and respect the rights of others, provided they know what those rights are.
Potential conflicts between persons who might otherwise vie for control of a
given resource are thus avoided. Therefore, an entitlements theory demands that
the boundaries of protected domains be ascertainable, not only by judges who
must resolve disputes that have arisen, but, perhaps more importantly, by the
affected persons themselves before any dispute occurs. 85

Furthermore, as the research and development of the patentee's competitors may
parallel that of the patent applicant, the sooner the competitors realize that someone
else has found the "treasure, " 86 the sooner the competitors can cease what may be
wasteful duplicative research and focus their research and development efforts
elsewhere. 87 Thus, proprietary boundaries clearly demarcated ex ante not only deter
infringing third-party technological development, but will guide the rent-seeking
behavior of competitors who wish to improve upon or design around the claimed
invention. 88

Ill. CONSENT THEORY AND LOCALIZED KNOWLEDGE

A. Freedom From Contract
With the understanding that a patent is a property rule entitlement, 89 we must next
examine when and under what circumstances the transfer or invalidation of this
entitlement is legitimate. Contract theory can inform this examination. 90 The patent
prosecution process is in many ways like a contract negotiation between the patent
applicant and the PT0, 91 whereby the PTO acts as the agent of society, including
the applicant's competitors. All contracts are incomplete to a certain degree; the
contract between the patent applicant and the PTO is no exception. This

85. Randy E. Bamett,A ConsentTheoryofContract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269,301-02 (1986)
(footnotes omitted).
86. RICHARD A. PosNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 35-37 (3d ed. 1986).
87. See Dam, supra note 39, at 265 ("Since rival firms will not normally know, or at least often
cannot be sure, that a patent application has been filed, they may be inclined to continue R & D
even though they will later learn, on issuance of the patent, that they should have ceased or
redirected their R & D efforts.").
88. See infra notes 140-70.
89. See supra notes 68-88.
90. See Barnett, supra note 85, at 294 ("The legitimacy of principle of contract that determines
which transfers of rights are valid depends upon the nature of individual entitlements and the
extent to which rights have bee11 or will be acquired by the parties to the transfer.").
Contract law, according to an entitlements approach, is thus a body of general
principles and more specific rules the function of which is to identif'y the rights of
individuals engaged in transferring entitlements, and thereby indicate when physical
or legal force may legitimately be used to preserve those rights and to rectif'y any
unjust interference with the transfer process.
ld. at295.
91. See supra note 37.
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incompleteness is due largely to the inaccessibility of technical knowledge (i.e.,
prior art), 92 which somewhere down-.the road, once factories are built and further
investments are made, will likely be discovered and used against the patent owner
to challenge the validity of his patent.
I am particularly concerned with invalidity determinations based upon prior art
that was not considered by the PTO during the prosecution of the patent. A notable
empirical study conducted by Paul Allison and Mark Lemley looked at, among other
things, validity determinations based primarily on prior art that was considered by
the PTO (cited prior art) and prior art that was not considered by the PTO (uncited
prior art). 93 Their study demonstrates that (1) "most" of the prior art references
asserted during litigation in support of invalidation are references that were not
considered by the PTO during prosecution; (2) in cases where patents were in fact
invalidated, the party challenging validity "disproportionately relied upon" art that
was not considered by the PTO; and (3) "[t]he probability of invalidity based on
uncited art was 40.8%, while the probability of invalidity based on cited art was
29.6%." 94 Allison and Lemley conclude that statistically their data "indicate with
a fair degree of confidence that reliance on uncited art was more likely to lead to a
finding of invalidity than reliance on cited art." 95 Indeed, the Federal Circuit and
district courts are quite candid about their lack of deference to the PTO with respect
to non-cited prior art. 96
If the patentee and PTO had knowledge bf invalidating prior art during
prosecution, it is likely that the bargain struck would have produced patent claims
of narrower scope (or a patent may not have issued at all). A competitor, on the
other hand, may conclude, based upon an ex post self-study of the patent and
prosecution history, that the patentee's proprietary boundaries are lirilited by prior

92. See infra Part ill B.
93. Allison & Lemley, supra note 24, at 231-34.
94. ]d. at 234; see also mpra note 45.
95. Allison & Lemley, mpra note 24, at 234.
96. See Ryco, Inc. v. AG-BAG Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that
although the burden on the party challenging validity "remains on the challenger, it may be more
easily met where the challenger produces prior art that is more pertinent than that considered by
the Patent and Trademark Office''); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
When an attacker [of the patent's validity), in sustaining the burden imposed by
§ 282, produces prior art or other evidence not considered in the PTO, there is ...
no reason to defer to the PTO so far as its effect on validity is concerned. Indeed,
new prior art not before the PTO may so clearly invalidate a patent that the burden
is fully sustained merely by proving its existence and applying the proper law ....
When new evidence touching on validity of the patent not considered by the PTO
is relied on, the tribunal considering it is not faced with having to disagree with the
PTO or with deferring to its judgment or with taking its expertise into account. The
evidence may, therefore, carry more weight and go further toward sustaining the
attacker's unchanging burden.
!d. (emphasis omitted); see Fenton Golf Trust v. Cobra Golf,Inc.,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198,
1200 (N.D. ill. 1998) ("[I)n cases such as this one where the patent office examiner did not
consider the relevant prior art 'the trial judge is thrown back on nothing more than his own best
judgment concerning the implications of that prior art .... "')(quoting Mueller Brass Co. v.
Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1367 (E.D. Pa 1972)).
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art neither considered by the PTO, nor the patentee during prosecution. A court,
however, invoking the doctrine of equivalents may disagree with the competitor and
conclude that. the patentee is entitled to enjoy claim scope above and beyond what
the competitor asserts. The point is that we just don't know. In this regard, the
doctrine of equivalents may be viewed as a sort of implied-in-law contract that is
imposed upon the competitor. In many ways, the doctrine of equivalents creates a
fiction in the name of equity. 97
In either event, whether we are talking about invalidation or infringement, an
imposition has been visited upon the parties based upon information that was not
part of the original contract negotiation. This imposition violates what some
contract theorists have referred to as "freedom from contract," 98 which states that
within an entitlements system "transfers of property rights should not be imposed
upon [the parties] without their consent." 99 Accordingly,
[i]n a system of entitlements where manifested rights transfers are what justify
the legal enforcement of agreements, any such manifestation necessarily implies
that one intends to be "legally bound," to adhere to one's commitment.
Therefore, the phrase "a manifestation of an intention to be legally bound"
neatly captures what a court should seek to ftnd before holding that a contractual
obligation has been created. 100

Prior art considered for the first_ time during litigation was not part of the original
bargain. Although we usually do not think in these terms, we should ask: During the
contract negotiations (i.e., patent prosecution), was there, with respect to the newly
cited prior art, a "manifestation of an intention to be legally bound" on the part of
the patentee? I do not think so. 101 When a patent is invalidated based on new prior

97. It should be noted; however, that the trend at the Federal Circuit has been to limit the
application of the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d
1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997).(''[A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate
broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost
of its failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.").
98. Barnett, supra note 35, at 840-41.
99. I d. at 841. Barnett asserts that a contractual obligation arises. Indeed, informed consent
plays a crucial role in the notice function of the patent claim:
In contract law, this infonnational or "boundary defining" requirement means that
an assent to alienate rights must be manifested in some manner by one party to the
other to serve as a criterion of enforcement. Without a manifestation of assent that
is accessible to all affected parties, that aspect of a system of entitlements that
governs transfers of rights will fail to achieve its main function. At the time of the
transaction, it will have failed to identity clearly and communicate to both parties
(and to third parties) the rightful boundaries that must be respected. Without such
communication, parties to a transaction (and third parties) cannot accurately ascertain
what constitutes rightful conduct and what constitutes a commitment on which they
can rely. Disputes that might otherwise have been avoided will occur, and the
attendant uncertainties of the transfer process will discourage reliance.
Barnett, supra note 85, at 302 (emphasis and both parentheticals in original).
100. Barnett, supra note 85, at 304 (citation omitted).
I 0 I. Ifthe prior art was considered during prosecution, there is a good chance that the resulting
patent claims, and thus the conduct of the parties, would have reflected such.
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art, the liberty interest of the patentee (and the competitorY 02 is impinged upon, if
not violated, by such an imposition, 103 as the patentee loses his proprietary interest
when his patent is invalidated and transferred to the public domain without his
consent. 104 Indeed, one can argue that there is a moral dimension to this forced
transfer. 105 To invalidate the patent ex post based on information that was not part
of the original contract negotiations, and therefore was not consented to, seems not
only bad long-term patent policy, but unjust. 106

102. Even though the competitor does not have a property interest in the form of a patent, he
presumably has invested a great deal of money and resources in designing a pro.duct that either
improves upon or designs around the patent claims. A finding of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents is a proprietary loss (at times an extraordinary loss) to the competitor not only
because he may have to pay damages, but the benefits resulting from his improvement or designaround efforts have been diminished.
103. See Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193, 194 (1982).
[T]he spirit of a people at any given time may be measured by the opportunity and
incentive to exercise "freedom to" and the felt ffi:cessity to assert "freedom from."
Similarly, the nature of a society and its legal order may be determined by the force
and permissible scope ofthese two concepts of liberty and how the inevitable tension
between them is resolved.

!d.
104. See Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, lnfonnalion, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Properiy, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 300 (1984) ("When we already own property, we want to
ensure that we can control its disposition-that a new 'owner' will not come into existence without
our consent.") (emphasis omitted); see also Harold Demsetz, Some Aspects ofProperty Rights,
9 J .L. & EcoN. 61, 62 (1966) ("A private property right system requires the prior consent of
'owners' before their property can be affected by others.").
105. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 299-300.
[T]he consent of the rights holder to be legally obligated is the moral component that
distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights in a system of
entitlements ....
. . . [Thus] legal enforcement is morally justified because the promisor voluntarily
performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation
by transferring alienable rights.
!d. (footnotes omitted).
106. Randy Barnett writes that the "problem of communicating the requirements ofjustice is
handled by the formal requirements oflegality associated with the liberal conception of the rule of
Jaw." Barnett, Sllpra note 35, at 856. He cites the work of Lon Fuller as a source of these
requirements oflegality. Fuller, in The Morality ofLaw, lists' eight ways or "routes" in which "an
attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry:" Routes two through four are
particularly relevant for present purposes. They are:
(2) a fuilure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules
he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only
cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect,
since it puts them under the threirt ofretrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules
understandable.
LoN FuLLER, Tim MORALITY OF LAw 38-39 (1969); see also Barnett, Sllpra note 85, at 298.
"[Justice is] ... rendering every man his due. A man's due is what he has acquired
by his own efforts and not taken from some other man without consent. A
community in which this conception is realized will be one in which the members
agree not to interfere in the legitimate endeavors of each other to achieve their
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Although one may argue that it was an ex ante foreseeable risk that newly
discovered prior art would surface during litigation, and that the patentee should
bear the loss, 107 this argument not only fails to consider who is in a better position
to bear the loss ex post, 108 but also ignores the message, one of uncertainty, which
it sends to future inventors and entrepreneurs-those very individuals who seek to
improve upon or design aroUnd the patented invention. 109 The result may be the
lessening of entrepreneurial inventive activity and underutilization of knowledge. 110
This is particularly true with respect to the small inventor. However, it is the small
inventor who has been, somewhat ironically, among the most vocal in the fight

individual goals, and to help each other to the extent that the conditions for doing so
are mutually satisfactory .... Such a community will be one giving the freest
possible rein to all its members to develop their particular capacities and use them to
carry out their plans for their own betterment .... [T]his activity is The Good for
Man .... "
Id (quoting W a!lace Matson, Justice: A Funeral Oration, Soc. PHIL. & PoL' Y, Autumn I 9 83, at
94, 111-12 (emphasis added) (alterations in original)).
107. See, e.g., Richard A Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 105-10 (1977) (arguing
that under the impossibility doctrine the parfy who, ex ante, was better able to foresee tbe risk
should bear the loss). A related argument is that the patentee should have conducted a more
thorough patent search, and if prior art surfaces during litigation that was not part of the original
prosecution, the patentee implicitly assumed such a risk and has no one to blame but himself See,
e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts,
69 MINN. L. REv. 521, 538 (1985) ("If the exchange is ... a voluntary one between rational
actors, then any 'failure' to include specific terms or to consider a specific risk may itself be a
voluntary part of the agreement. What the parties have agreed to, in effect, is to consider only
certain risks and no others."). This criticism, however, fails to take into consideration (1)
knowledge that is supposedly publicly accessible, but practically undiscoverable, see Coffin v.
Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1873); (2) non-patent publications that are in obscure
publications or are only indexed (not dis11eminated) in domestic or foreign libraries, see In re Hall,
781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986), and (3) "secret prior art" under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994),
see Thomson, SA. v. Quixote Corp., 166 F.3d 1172, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1999); International Glass
Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395,403 (Ct. CL 1969).
108. For instance, investments may be made in manufacturing facilities, distribution channels,
employees, etc.
109. See irifra Part ffi.
110. These notions are dear to the Austrian School of Economics conception of contract. See
Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School ofEconomics, 54 FoRDHAML.
REv. 507, 527 (1986).
Professors Kronman and Posner believe the justification for contracts is that both
parties ex ante benefit from them. A mistake or subsequent change in circumstances
may destroy that mutual benefit, and any such result should, according to Kronman
and Posner, be rectified by allocating the risk of that mistake or subsequen,t change
to the party to whom it would have been allocated if both parties had been fully
perc.eptive and informed. The Austrians, by contrast, regard entrepreneurial
perceptiveness as an essential skill to be encouraged, and their defense of contract is
not that both parties necessarily benefit ex ante from every contract but that over the
long run the system of contracting encourages the full use of human knowledge.
!d. (footnotes omitted); see also lsRAELM KlRzNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY AND PRoFIT 21517 (1979) (discussing the discovery and exploitation of existing errors in a "disequilibrium
market").
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against establishing an opposition proceeding in the United States. The concern on
the part of small inventors is that an opposition proceeding will be used, or abused,
by large corporations in a dilatory fashion. This is a legitimate concern.u 1
Nevertheless, there are counter-balancing benefits flowing from an opposition
proceeding, namely enhanced proprietary certainty (a stronger shield) and a
reduction in litigation (or certainly the threat of litigation), which can be much more
costly and debilitating than defending an opposition. u 2
It is crucial to note, however, that an opposition proceeding should be
accompanied by a narrowing of the standards of review currently employed by the
courts when determining validity. It makes little sense to have an opposition
proceeding if a court will review validity de novo based on prior art that was
initially considered by the PT0. 113 Ine,leed, in response to my survey, several district
court judges indicated that they would favor an opposition proceeding if the
appellate standard of review for validity was narrower than it is presently. As one
judge stated, "My 'yes' (to an opposition proceeding] is qualified. The question is
whether any finality would attach to the determmation by the PTO. In other words,

Ill. However, in recent years the opposition rate in. the European Patent Office (''EPO'') has
been less than 10%. For example, in 1997, the EPO issued 39,646 patents ofwhich 2518 or 6.3%
were opposed. See EPO Website (last modified 1998) <http://www.european-patent-office.org>;
see also Harold C. Wegner, Patent Law Simplification and the Geneva Convention, 14 AIPLA
Q.J. 154, 200-01 (1986) (asserting that abusive tactics in the European Patent Convention have
been greatly diminished, and that the opposition rate in Europe is only about I 0% ).
112. Greater proprietary security and reducing litigation are1wo of the primary objectives of the
reexamination statute, which permits third parties to challenge the validity of an issued patent if
a substantial new question of patentability arises usually as a result of newly found prior art. See
Patent Reexamination: Hearings on S. 1679 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. 2 (1979) [hereinafter Paten/Reexamination Hearings] (opening statement of Sen. Birch
Bayh).
All too often the granting of a U.S. patent turns out to be an invitation to endless
litigation as competitors pull out all of the stops to invalidate or infringe on an
impm;tant patent. Small businesses and independent inventors are especially
susceptible to this threat ....
. . . The cost of such litigation to both parties frequently exceeds $250,000 [(now
usually over $1 million)]. Many independent inventors and small business owners
not able to pay such fees are susceptible to being "blackmailed" into allowing
infiingements on their patents or are forced to license them for nominal fees to avoid
going to court. This creates a situation where the patent system is used as a club to
beat down the very people that it was formed to protect. While patents are important
to all businesses, they are the lifeblood to the independent inventor or small business
owner who uses the patent grant as a shield to protect their invention from stronger
competitors.

!d.
113. Interestingly, in/n re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786,791 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the
Federal Circuit held that for purposes of reexamination, a "substantial new question of
patentability" under 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1981) is not created by combining references that were
already considered by the PTO during the original examination. See also In re Recreative Tech.
Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (''Reexamination is barred for questions of
patentability that were decided in the original examination.'').
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if the challenge can be renewed in litigation on a de novo basis, I doubt the value
of the PTO proceeding."u 4
Having discussed the injustice of invalidating a patent based on prior art that was
not considered by the PTO, we must ask what the alternative is. Certainly, I am not
suggesting that existing patents that never should have issued should continue to
exist. To do so would work an injustice on society, as the social costs associated
with legitimately issued patents become simply unbearable with illegitimately
issued patents. Thus, we have competing policy considerations between protecting
the patentee's proprietary interest and investment on the one hand; and, on the other
hand, eradicating patents that never should have issued. The goal here is to reduce
the damage costs of erroneous patentability decisions in a cost-efficient manner, as
the cost of achieving a correct patentability decision can become too high as well.
An opposition proceeding goes a long way toward achieving this goal, particularly
since illegitimately issued patents are largely a result of incomplete information
during prosecution. An opposition proceeding will provide a mechanism whereby
technical information is funneled into the original contract negotiations. The
resultmg proprietary boundaries will reflect the technical knowledge that was
before the contracting parties and informed their consent, and will also provide
competitors with a more fully developed public record upon which to rely. 115 In
essence, the technical knowledge, or prior art, can be viewed as adding resolution
to the inventor's blueprints, forcing him to adjust the position, width, and height of
his proprietary fence. In the end, there is greater certainty consi~tent with the notice
function of the patent claim, 115 which benefits those individuals both passively and
actively operating withiii the patent system.
In many ways, an opposition proceeding is similar to the current reexamination
proceeding, as the policies underlying both regimes and the benefits flowing
therefrom parallel each other. With respect to reexamination, the Federal Circuit
identified three "benefits":
First, the new procedure could settle validity disputes more quickly and less
expensively than the often protracted litigation involved in such cases. Second,
the procedure would allow courts to refer patent validity questions to the
expertise of the Patent Office. . . . Third, reexamination would reinforce
"investor confidence in the certainty of patent rights" by affording the PTO a
broader opportunity to review "doubtful patents." 117

Of course, a significant difference between an opposition and a reexamination is
that the former will occur prior to the issuance of a patent whereas a reexamination
takes place during the life of an existing patent. This distinction is important

114. Statement of a federal district court judge in response to my questionnaire (on file with
author).
115. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The
claims, specification, and file history ... constitute the public record of the patentee's claim, a
record on which the public is entitled to rely.").
116. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
117. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citation omitted)
(quoting 126 CoNG. REc. 29,895 (1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
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because an opposition proceeding will likely achieve ex ante many of the benefits
of a reexamination proceeding. us
Importantly, in enacting the reexamination statute, Congress recognized that
invalidity holdings were largely based on prior art that was not considered by the
PTO during the original examinationY 9 That was true in 1980 when the
reexamination statute was enacted, 120 a.11d it remains L--ue today. 121
B. The Decentralized Nature of Technical Knowledge
The benefits. of an opposition proceeding become more apparent once we
understand that one of the primary problems with the PTO's patentability
determinations is the inaccessibility of technical information, particularly nonpatent technical publications and unpublished information. At any given moment,
there are researchers scattered throughout the world, engaging in technological
activities related to the claimed invention. A great deal of this research will be
published in technical journals (some more obscure than others); some of it will
not. The point is that much of this research-both published and unpublished-is
undiscovered by the patent applicant and PTO, yet is material to the question of
patentability and ultimate claim scope. 122 Frequently, however, this art will be

118. Furthennore, an opposition proceeding would allow significantly greater third-party
involvement than the current reexamination proceeding.
119. See Patent Reexamination Hearings, supra note 112, at 2 ("All too often patent holders
find themselves in lengthy court proceedings where valuable patents are challenged on the grounds
that the patent examiner missed pertinent data during the initial patent search."); id. at 21
(testimony ofDonald R. Dunner, President of the American Patent Law Association) ("[I]t is our
feeling that regardless of how much money is spent in the patent system to improve the operation
of the Patent Office, it is inevitable, with computers or otherwise, that all of the prior art will not
be uncovered.").
120. See KoENJG, supra note 24, §5.05[4] ("In many cases the Patent Office and the courts are
not determining patentability on the bases of the same prior art. Where this is true, the Patent
Office may be faulted for not finding the best prior art, but not for applying a lower standard of
patentability."); see also Federico, supra note 24, at 249.
121. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 24, at 234.
122. Much ofthis prior art is, for practical pwposes, publicly inaccessible and searching for such
would likely result in inordinate search costs. For example, 35 U.S. C. § 102(a) (1994) states that
a patent shall issue unless "the invention was known or used by others in this country." Jd.
Although the tenns "known" and "used" have been interpreted to mean publicly known or used,
see Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (1 0 How.) 477, 496 (1850), the publicity required will be satisfied
in the absence of deliberate concealment, see State Indus., Inc. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA)305,316-17 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), aff'd in part andrev'd in part, 769 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir.
1985).Another example of invalidating activity that is practically inaccessible is "on-sale" events
as set forth in§ 102(b). 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Section 102(b) states that an applicant will be barred
from obtaining a patent if the invention was offered for sale or on sale more than o~e year before
the filing ofthe patent application claiming the invention. !d. Rarely will the PTO be aware of onsale activity. Section 102(g) is yet another example of practically inaecessible prior art. Jd.
§ 102(g). Prior art under § 102(g) is a fonn of so-called secret prior art in that, unlike § 102(a),
there is no publicity requirement. See Thomson, SA v. Quixote Corp., 166 F.3d 1172, 1175 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); International Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395 passim (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(discussing 35 U.S. C. § 102). Importantly, prior art under § 102(a) (i.e., knowledge and use) and
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discovered during litigation by a party faced with an infringement suit, as
handsomely financed defendants will likely scour the earth for invalidating prior art.
AB the Federal.Circuit noted, "there is virtually always 'pertinent' and 'relevant'
art apparently unconsidered in the PTO and available to a patent challenger." 123 In
short, technical knowledge is widely dispersed and localized. Friedrich Hayek wrote
of the decentralized nature of knowledge:
"[D]ata" from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society
"given" to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never
be so given.
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is
determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of
which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of
society is ... how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the
members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals
know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem ofthe utilization of knowledge which
is not given to anyone in its totality. 124

Uninformed patentability determinations can be costly to both the patentee and
his competitors. The virtue of an opposition proceeding resides in its ability to
coordinate and channel vast amounts of technical information into a centralized
decisionmaking body (viz., the PTO) comprised of technical experts. As Hayek
notes, "[A]s far as scientific knowledge is concerned, a body of suitably chosen
experts may be in the best position to command all the best knowledge
available." 125 This "smoking out" or capturing of technical information is a way to

(g) is usually not documented, and thus must be proven through the use of oral testimony.
123. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also In re
Portola, 110 F.3d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Discussing the policy justifications for a
reexamination proceeding, the court cited the congressional testimony of Donald R. Dunner, the
presidentoftheAmericanPatent Law Association, who stated, "[I]t is inevitable ... that all of the
prior art will not be uncovered [by the PTO]. A determined advocate, desiring to do in a patent,
spending tens of thousands of dollars in litigation situations, can often,. if not always, find
something that has not been considered by the [PTOJ. ").
124. FRIEDRICH A HAYEK, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND
EcoNOMIC ORDER 77-78 (1948); see also Brian J. Loasby, Economics of Dispersed and
Incomplete lnfonnation, in MEmoD, PROCESs, AND AusTRIAN EcoNOMICS 114 (Israel W. Kirzner
ed. 1982).
125. HAYEK, supra note 124, at 80. Although when discussing the virtues of a market system,
Hayek was not necessarily referring to scientific knowledge, id., his point is nevertheless applicable
to scientific knowledge in the context of patent prosecution. By publishing the patent application,
the PTO as a centralized coordinator is placing competitors of the patent applicant and others on
notice that a patent has been presumptively granted. This publication ameliorates the knowledge
problem because competitors in possession of material knowledge (i.e., prior art) will be "smoked
ouf' and encouraged to come forward with their knowledge. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 84243.
Insuperable knowledge problems prevent us from allocating jurisdiction [(i.e., as
Barnett phrases it later in his article, "jurisdictions of diverse individuals and
associations over physical resources")] on the basis of which particular person or
group ofpersons is actually in the best position to know how certain resources may
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incorporate the private sector into the patentability determination-a sort of burden
shifting. 126 AB Randy Barnett writes of the "first-order" knowledge problem, "[T]he
distribution of jurisdiction over physical resources should mirror as closely as
possible the distribution of access to knowledge in society." 127 The goal is to
allocate resources in a way that maximizes widely dispersed and localized technical
knowledge so that the bargain ultimately struck between the patent applicant and
the PTO, as reflected in the patent claims, remains faithful to the consent of the
parties and results in more clearly demarcated patent· claims. AB a result, invalidity
findings based on newly found prior art will occur less often, and the courts will not
feel as compelled to invoke the imposing doctrine of equivalents. As one federal
district court judge, in response to my survey, succinctly put it, "If we are going to
give a presumption in favor of the patentee, the examiner should not wear
blinders. " 128 ·
Although there will nonetheless exist undiscovered prior art due to, as noted
above, the decentralized nature of knowledge, this burden shifting will neutralize
the patent applicant's advantage under an ex parte procedure and level the playing
field by arming the PTO with prior art that it or the patent applicant did not
discover. This result will hopefully breed more confidence by the bench and the bar
in the PTO's patentability determinations.
IV. THE VIRTUES OF CERTAINTY

Proprietary and competitive certainty are virtues in patent law and, under 35
U.S. C. § 112, find expression in the patent claim, as it is the claim that defmes the

be used. If a centralized institution charged with allocating jurisdictions knew what

it needed to know to make such allocations, a decentralized jurisdictional strategy
would be unnecessary. The most we can hope for is to determine the general
characteristics of those who are in the best position to have knowledge of potential
resource uses, regardless of whether they in fact always have the best knowledge. In
sum, we rely on these general characteristics to establish a presumption of
competence in favor of individuals and groups who have access to the personal and
local knowledge pertaining to their own situation.

!d.
126. Often times, the commercial success of a patented invention is not realized until several

years after the patent has issued. See Dam, supra note 39, at 258 ("[M]any fundamental patents
are not successfully commercialized for a decade or even substantially longer after issuance."). As
such, potential opposers may refrain from filing an opposition Jest, in hindsight, they come to
realize an opposition wa8 not worth pursuing. For this reason, not only should the present
reexamination proceeding allow for greater third-party participation, but potential opposers also
need an incentive to file an opposition. For example, if a competitor does not oppose the issuance
of a patent, perhaps a strengthened presumption of validity will accompany the patent during
litigation or the competitor may be estopped during litigation from challenging the validity of the
patent on certain grounds.
127. Barnett, supra note 35, at 842.
128. Statement of a federal district court judge in response to my questionnaire (on file with
author).
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metes and bounds of the patentee's property interest. 129 AB Judge Rich has written,
the claim is not "the measure of what was invented," rather, ''the claims are the
measure of the patentee's right to exclude." 130 In short, "the name of the game is
the claim. " 131 Thus, it is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the patent
claim, for it is at the center of what may be called patent law's dynamic triangle,
comprising (I) the patentee; (2) the patentee's competitors; and (3) the public
welfare.
However, the modem patent claim does not provide the requisite degree of
certainty. Judge Plager of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has expressed incredulity at the weakness and susceptibility of the patent grant:
I can't imagine an administrative law arrangement where you get a license, a
permit, a grant of right, which people can challenge time and time again .

. . . It not only surprises me, it amazes me. Why would you possibly have a
system that gives you a government grant which is little more than a right to
litigate? That's what it really is-a federal right to litigate. Well, when I make a
great invention I don't want a federal right to litigate-! want a protected
property interest in that invention. 132

An ambiguous patent claim begets a weak patent grant, which adversely affects
the entire patent system. Not only is the proprietary interest of the patentee
threatened, but the patentee's competitors are left in a precarious situation. In this
regard, the Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., wrote:
"[T]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the
encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the
subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public." Otherwise, a
"zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the
risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than
unequivocal foreclosure of the field," and "[t]he public [would] be deprived of
rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits
these rights. " 133

Indeed, a "zone ofuncertainty" is potentially devastating to the interests of those
who are inclined to improve upon or design around the patentee's claimed
invention. As Judge William Bryson noted in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell,
Inc.:
Patent counselors should be able to advise their clients, with some confidence,
whether to proceed with a product or process of a particular kind. The
consequences of advice that turns ·out to be incorrect can be devastating, and the

129. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention.").
130. Rich, supra note 6, at vi (emphasis in original).
131. Giles S. Rich, Extent ofProtection and Interpretation ofClaims-American Perspectives,
21 INT'L REv.lNDus. PRoP. & CoPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).
132.An Interview with Circuit JudgeS. Jay Plager, J. PRoPRIETARY RTS., Dec. 1993, at 2, 6.
133. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,390 (1996) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
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costs of uncertainty-unjustified caution or the devotion of vast resources to the
sterile enterprise oflitigation-can be similarly destructive. 134

Furthermore, a district court judge, in response to my questionnaire, echoed
Judge Bryson's concern:
Patent cases usually involve products that have some design differences.
Whether this is an infringement, or whether the patent is valid as to the
challenge, is a matter where uncertainty is economically harmful. Early
resolution of that uncertainty would be much preferable to subsequent
litigation. 135

In addition to the interest of the patentee and his competitors, there is a
significant public welfare aspect underlying notions of certainty in the patent law.
American intellectual property Jaw has traditionally been justified in utilitarian or
consequentialist tenns. 136 Utilitarians posit that but for the prospect of a patent (or
copyright) and the concomitant right to exclude, adequate incentives for the creation
of intellectual property would not exist, resulting in a less than "socially optimal
output of intellectual products." 137 That is:
If competitors could simply copy books, movies, and records, and take one
another's inventions and business techniques, there would be no .incentive to
spend the vast amounts of time, energy, and money necessary to develop these
products and techniques. It would be in each firm's self-interest to let others
develop products, and then mimic the result. No one would engage in original
development, and consequently no new writings, inventions, or business
techniques would be developed. To avoid this disastrous result, the argument
claims, we must continue to grant intellectual property rights.

Notice that this argument focuses on the users of intellectual products,
rather than on the producers. Granting property rights to producers is here seen
as necessary to ensure that enough intellectual products (and the countless other
goods based on these products) are available to users. The grant of property
rights to the producers is a mere means to this end. 138

134. Litton Sys.; Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see Merrill v.
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568,573-74 (1877) ("[N]othing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee
and to the public, than that the former should understand and correctly describe just what he has
invented, and for what he claims a patent.").
135. Statement of e federal district court judge in response to my questionnaire (on file with
author).
136. Consequetialism holds that "all actions are right or wrong in virtue of the value oftheir
consequences." THE OXFORD CoMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 154 (Honderich ed. 1995).
Consequentialists, as the name suggests, focus on the consequences our patent laws have on the
public good.
137. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PuB . .AFF. 31, 48 (1989).
See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, .AN INTRoDUCTION TO TilE PRINciPLES OF MoRALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums et al. eds., 1970) (discussing in part, the concept of societal and
individual utility).
138. Hettinger, supra note 137, at 48 (emphasis added) (parenthetical in original); see also
Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual
Property, 68 CHl.-KENrL.REv. 841,854 (1993) (According to the utilitarian justification, "useful
works will be elicited through the rational self-interest of authors [and inventors] up to the point
at which their social costs exceed their social benefits."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954)
("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
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Thus, when analyzing our patent system we must be cognizant of three entities:
(1) the patentee; (2) the patentee's competitors; and (3) the public. This dynamic
triangle feeds off of the engine of inventive activity and technological progress,
which in turn is fueled by a secure and clearly demarcated patent grant. Viewing
patent rights as property rule entitlements, the strength of which are buoyed by a
post-grant opposition proceeding, goes a long way toward realizing optimal
certainty ex ante 139 and arming patentees and their competitors with the requisite
proprietarj and competitive certainty.
Let's now take a look at the relationship between certainty and incentive in our
patent system by exploring the role of certainty in incentive-to-improve theory and
incentive-to-design-around theory.
A. Certainty and the Incentive To Improve

One of the fundamental policies of patent law is to "promote[] disclosure of
inventions" so as "to stimulate further innovation." 140 Building upon and access to
preexisting knowledge is central to efficient technological advancement. 141 As
Edmund Kitch writes, "each innovation generates shifts in the matrix of
technological possibilities, and the realization of the possibilities may have a
significance that dwarfs the original invention considered alone. " 142
When we speak of"improvement patents," however, we must keep in mind one
ofthe basic tenets of patent law: one may obtain a patent on a particular invention
yet still infringe an extant patent. Consider the following example:
Inventor 1 patents a widget comprising elements A, B, and C. Inventor 2
improves upon Inventor 1 's invention by adding D, thus giving Inventor 2 a
patent on a widget comprising elements A, B, C, and D (assume D is a
nonobvious addition to A, B, and C). Although patented, Iaventor 2 cannot
practice his invention as it would infringe Inventor 1 's patent because Inventor
2's invention contains each and every element (A, B, and C) claimed in Inventor

copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts.'") (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
139. See Rich, supra note 131, at 499, 501.
The U.S. is strictly an examination country and the main purpose ofthe examination,
to which every application is subjected, is to try and make sure that what each claim
defines is patentable ....
. . . [T]he function of claims is to enable everyone to know, without going through
a lawsuit, what infringes the patent and what does not.
ld.

I 40. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
141. See, e.g., RICHARD R NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
EcoNOMlCCHANGE 130 (1982); Merges & Nelson, supra note 75, at 843-44; Suzanne Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders ofGiants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, J. EcoN. PERSP.,
Winter 199l,at29,30-31.
142. Kitch, supra note 42, at 271.
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l's patent. On the other hand, Inventor 1 cannot practice Inventor 2's invention
without the permission of the latter .143

What we have in this situation is what is known in patent law as "blocking
patents"; a situation that is largely influenced by market forces. At least three things
can happen: (I) the parties cross-license each other; a seemingly attractive option
if indeed the improvement adds significant value to the original patent; 144 (2) the
parties sell the patents to a third party who will coordinate future development and
improvement; or (3) the parties fail to come together for whatever reason (e.g., high
transaction costs), even if the value of the improvement is commerCially
significant. 145
•
The point to be made here is that the improver has bargaining power in the form
of a patented invention. There is a significant difference between being an infringer
with a patent and an infringer without a patent. Without a patent, not only will the
improver infringe the extant patent, but he would be unable to preclude others from
using his unpatentable improvement. On the other hand, a patent, while not
allowing the improver to escape infringement, will arm the improver with
bargaining power as he is now able to preclude others, including the owner of the
patent that he infringes, from making, using, or selling his improvement.
Competitive certainty is of the utmost importance in this regard because the
improver needs to know with some predictability which improvements will be novel
and nonobvious over the extant patented technology. As Kenneth Dam has written,
"(l]t is important that the line between the patented and the unpatented be clearly
demarcated in the patent itself, rather than being left to future litigation .... " 146
This predictability is facilitated through an opposition proceeding whereby the
proprietary boundaries of the claimed invention sought to be improved upon are

143. CHisUMET AL., supra note 6, at 5 n.16 (emphasis added).
144. See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 n.5 (1931). Referring
to cross-licensing, the Court stated:
This is often the case where patents covering improvements of a basic process,
owned by one manufacturer, are granted to another. A patent may be rendered quite
useless, or "blocked," by another unexpired patent which covers a vitally related
feature of the manufacturing process. Unless some agreement can be reached, the
, parties are hampered and exposed to litigation. And, frequently, the cost of litigation
to a patentee is greater than the value of a patent for a minor improvement.

I d.
145. See Lemley, supra note 62, at 1067 n.350.
While it might seem irrational to think that an original inventor would suppress an
improvement within her control if it truly was valuable, several circumstances might
induce her to do so. If the improvement requires a new manufacturing technology
or a different market approach, there may be substantial fixed costs associated with
switching over production from the old to the new way. The further removed the
improvement is from the original invention, the worse this problem is likely1o be..
. . The alternative to switching over production facilities ... is also unlikely to be
attractive 1o the origimil inventor. Even ifthe licensor could extract the full value of
the improvement in: a licensing transaction, which seems unlikely, its market control
will disappear along with the intellectual property right.
Jd. For a general discussion of blocking patents, see Merges, supra note 59.
146. Dam, supra note 39, at267.
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clearly demarcated ex ante, at least to a greater extent than they would be under the
present ex parte system.
Let's take one step back and look at the improvement process. There are times
when the written description of a patent itself will suggest to an improver a
particular idea or experiment that will not infringe the patent. The improver will
then proceed with his experimentation, presumably unencumbered by litigation or
a threat thereof. However, most of the time the improver must make use of the
patented invention in 1-.is research, in which case, the improver will either have to
purchase the patented product on the open market, which conveys an implied
license to use the product, 147 or obtain a license from the patent holder to use the
patented technology. It is anything but a forgone conclusion that the patent holder
will agree to grant the improver a license, especially if the improver poses a
commercial threat to the patent holder or the transaction costs are otherwise
prohibitively high. 148 To the extent that licensing negotiations break down because
of problems of valuation or claim scope, an opposition proceeding may facilitate an
agreefi1ent, particularly if the original patent was recently issued. Because
competitors have a voice in the claimed invention's examination, an opposition
proceeding creates a more complete prosecution history, which in turn breeds a
sense of intimacy with both the claim scope and value of the claimed invention.
With that said, licensing negotiations will no doubt continue to break down. In
which case, the would-be improver may channel his inventive energies
elsewhere. 149 One alternative is for the improver to design around the patented
invention and avoid infringement altogether, in. which case the benefit of an
opposition proceeding becomes perhaps even more important.

147. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241,249 (1942).
148. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress ofScience: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1017, 1072-73 (1989).
The risk that the parties will be unable to agree on terms for a license is greatest
when subsequent researchers want to use prior inventions to make further progress
in the same field in competition with the patent holder, especially if the research
threatens to render the patented invention technologically obsolete.
ld.; see also JoHNW. SCHLICHER, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 47 (1996) (stating that the
primary transaction costs are 1) the information costs of identifying buyers and sellers, and
informing buyers ofthe rights for sale, and 2) the costs of negotiating agreements, performing
under them, and detecting and stopping violations). An argument can be made that an opposition
proceeding will have the effect of reducing the information costs as patent applications will be
published, presumably in journals that are read on a regular basis.
149. This is not to say that the improver may not proceed in his experimentation without a
license, particularly if the improver was confident that he could patent the improvement and thus
position himself at the bargaining table with the original patentee. See Eisenberg, supra note 148,
at 1044 ("Some subsequent researchers might find it worthwhile to improve a patented invention
even without a license if the improvement itself were patentable.").
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B. Certainty and the Incentive To De .sign Around

As the name "design around" suggests, third part,ies, usually a competitor, may
purposefully circumvent the boundaries of the patent claim and create a competitive
non-infringing alternative to the claimed invention. The practice of designing
around existing patents creates competitive substitutes and advances, resulting in
competition among patented technoiogies. 150 The public clearly benefits from such
activity.m Indeed, as the Federal Circuit recently stated, "One of the benefits of a
patent system is its so-called 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's
products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations
to the marketplace." 152

150. Several economists and courts have a~serted that a patent grant does not necessarily
translate into monopolistic market power. See HERBERT HoVENCAMP, EcoNOMIC AND FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAw 156,219 (1985) ("[A] patented article ... may compete intensely with similar
products which are either unpatented or covered by different patents .... More often than not the
patent ... makes a product 'distinguishable' but confers little or no measurable market power upon
its owner."); SCHERER, .supra note 64, at 446 ("[F]ew patents are sufficiently basic and broad to
'fence in' a field altogether."). See also Justice O'Connor's conc~rring opinion in Jefferson Parish
Hospital v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), wherein she rejected the majority's presumption that a patent
or copyright leads to market power:
A common misperception has been that a patent or copyright . . . suffice[s] to
demonstrate market power. While ... [this] factorO might help to give market power
to a seller, it is also possible that a seller in these situations will have no market
power; for example, a patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense if
there are close substitutes for the patented product.
Jd at 38 n.7;Abbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991)("A patent does not
of itself establish a presumption of market power in the antitrust sense."); Chiuminatta Concrete
Concepts, Inc. v. Target Prods., Inc., No. CV 92-1523-LGB (SX), 1992 WL 465720 (C.D. Cal.
1992), aff'd mem., 19 F.3d 41 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Of course, there are occasions where a patent,
particularly a pharmaceutical patent, in and of itself confers monopolistic market power.
151. See Slim Fold Mfg., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Designing around patents is ... one of the ways in which the patent system works to the
advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose.").
152. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane)
(per curiam).
The ability ofthe public successfully to design around-to use the patent disclosure
to design a product or process that does not infringe, but like the claimed invention,
is an improvement over the prior art-'-is one of the important public benefits that
justifY awarding the patent owner exclusive rights to his invention.
I d. ;In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir.1994) ("Even after a patent has been awarded
for a new, useful, a.ild nonobvious practical application of an idea, others may learn from the
underlying ideas, theories, and principles to legitimately 'design around' the patentee's useful
application."); London v. Carson Pine Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("[D]esigniilg or inventing around patents to make new inventions is encouraged."); Y arway Corp.
v. Eur-Control USA, 775 F2d 268,277 (Fed. Cir. 1985). But see SCHERER, supra note 64, at 38687 (arguing that resources used in designing around patents could be put to better use); Donald F.
Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 450,455 (1969) (arguing
that resources used to design around patents could be spent on unsolved problems instead).
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The question that needs to be addressed for present purposes is how an
opposition proceeding relates to design-around theory. The answer is enhanced
certainty. To design around a patent claim, the competitor must know with some
particularity and certainty where the patentee's proprietary interest begins and ends
so as to allow the competitor to produce a viable alternative without being
subjected to an infringement suit. 153 For this to happen, competitors must have
confidence in their exegesis of the patent and public record. This is the rationale for
l.i.miting the use of extrinsic evidence (e.g., expert testimony) during ciaim
interpretation as competitors are entitled to rely on that which is of public record. 154
However, under the present ex parte system of patent prosecution and broad
standards of review, it is very difficult to determine the success of design-around
efforts at the time such efforts are made; that is, litigation is usually the answer,
often times a costly answer. 155 As Judge Newman has written:
Patent law is practiced mainly through legal advice and counseling over the
course of the commitment of creative and capital resources, to manage legal risk
in the already risky business of industrial innovation. Like all commercial law,
the cost of guessing wrong about the law and its application is rarely
recoverable. 156

We know that sometimes the parties simply cannot come to terms during
licensing negotiations and litigation is costly and often times unnecessary. Faced
with high trafisaction costs associated with licensing on the one hand and litigation
on the other, the competitor should have the viable option of designing around the
patented technology. Indeed, it is common practice for a competitor, wishing to
design around a claimed invention, to secure a "noninfringement opinion" from
patent counsel before making or using the design-around product or process. The
opinion is based on a study of the patent (and prosecution history), particularly the

153. See Carson Pirie Scott, 946 F 2d at 1538.
[C]laims must be "particular'' and "distinct," as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, so that
the public has fair notice of what the patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office
have agreed constitute the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. Notice
permits other parties to avoid actions which infringe the patent and to design around
the patent.

!d.
154. See Key Pharm. v. Hereon Lab. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716-17 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
In those cases where the public record. unambiguously describes the scope of the
patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper. The claims,
specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic evidence, constitute the public
record of the patentee's claim, a record on which the public is entitled to rely. In other
words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the established
rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed invention
and, thus, design around the claimed invention.

!d.
155. See Read Corp. v. Portee, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Of course,
determining when a patented device has been 'designed around' enough to avoid infringement is
a difficult determination to make. One cannot know for certain that changes are sufficient to avoid
infringement until a judge or a jury has made that determination.").
156. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM.
u. L. REv. 683, 687 (1993).
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patent claims, the prior art, and the competitor's product or process. An opposition
proceeding will provide greater clarity and flesh out those items that patent counsel
considers when writing a noninfringement opinion. If the opinion suggests that the
competitor's product or process does not infringe the patent, the competitor may
proceed with confidence in developing the product or process. According to the
Federal Circuit, "counsel's opinion must be thorough enough, as combined with
other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably hold
the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable. " 157 These opinions, however,
are all too often, in the eyes of judges and juries, inaccurate. Thus; although it is
difficult to write in unequivocal terms/ 58 the true value of the noninfringement
opinion todayis not necessarily to instill confidence in the competitor's designaround efforts or even to protect the competitor from a finding of infringement, but
rather to shield the competitor from a finding of willful infringement. 159 As such, the
crucial notice function of the patent claim has been diminished. The following two
cases will hopefully illustrate this point.
In Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co./ 60 Westvaco, a competitor of
International Paper Company ("IPC"), sought and obtained a noninfringement
opinion from its patent counsel "before it originally began manufacturing the
accused product." 161 Westvaco thereafter proceeded to "design around" IPC's
claimed technology. The Federal Circuit, while recognizing that Westvaco
"attempted to design around IPC's product," 162 nevertheless affirmed the district
court's finding ~f infringement:
Westvaco made specific structural changes to its product so that its product was
not a copy ofll'C's product. For example, as the district court found, Westvaco's
product included a tie layer between the inner layer of low density polyethylene
and the layer of ethylene vinyl alcohol. IPC' s claims do not include such a tie
layer. Westvaco's outside patent counsel deemed that change and others as
adequate to avoid infringement. Although this attempt to design around ll'C's
product proved unsuccessful, as evidenced by the court's finding of
infringement, Westvaco should not be found to have wilfully infringed based on
its attempt. 163

After affirming the finding of infringement, the court extolled the virtues of
design-around theory:

157. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F2d 936,944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
158. See Portee, 970 F.2d at 829 n.9 ("An opinion of counsel, of course, need not
unequivocally state that the client will not be held liable for infringement. An honest opinion is
more likely to speak of probabilities than certainties.").
159. The Federal Circuit has held that a "finding of willfulness requires the fact-finder to find
that clear and convincing evidence shows 'that the infringer acted in disregard of the patent ...
[and] had no reasonable basis for believing it had a right to do the acts."' American Med. Sys., Inc.
v. Medical Eng' g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.,
716 F.2d 1550, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (omission and alteration in original)). Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284, a fmding of willfulness can lead to treble damages. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994); see King
Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941,947 (Fed. Cir.1995).
160. 991 F2d 735 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
161./d. at744.
·
162. /d. at 745.
163./d.
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[K]eeping track of a competitor's products and designing new and possibly
better or cheaper functional equivalents is the stuff of which competition is made
and is supposed to benefit the consumer. One of the benefits of a patent system
is its so-called "negative incentive" to '~design around" a competitor's products,
even whim they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the
marketplace. It should not be discouraged by punitive damage awards .... 164

It seems that the attorney noninfringement opinion letter,.so common in modern
patent litigation, is really a non-willful infringement opinion letter. One could
rightfuiiy ask to what extent a fmding of no willfui infringement encourages
competitors to design around patented inventions. Doesn't a finding of infringement
actually provide a disincentive to design around? No doubt, many noninfringement
opinions are poorly drafted, but to the extent the opinion suffers from being illinformed about the prior art or the boundaries of the patented invention, an
opposition proceeding would have a remedial effect.
Attempting to design around a patent is even more risky if all that is available to
the competitor is a commercial embodiment of the claimed invention. In such a
situation, the competitor is more culpable as he does not have the guidance of claim
language; and, therefore, has no one to blame but himself if he is found to infringe.
Take the example of State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp. 165 Both State
Industries ("State") and A.O. Smith manufactured and sold industrial water heaters.
State filed for a patent on November 25, 1977, claiming a particular water heater.
Prior to issuance of the patent, State had begun to market its soon-to-be patented
invention under the name "Sandblaster." The accompanying literature stated
"Patent Applied For" and the following comment: "New exclusive feature of
Sandblaster water heater reduces build-up of sand, lime and sediment." As the court
noted, "[t]his was the totality of Smith's information on any 'patent position' by
State on the invention at bar until the commencement of this suit. " 166
Smith, a competitor of State, purchased the product on the open market and
attempted to design around it. The Federal Circuit noted that "Smith candidly
concedes in its brief before us that 'the appearance of [State Industries']
Sandblaster heater on the market spurred the defendant, Smith, into activity to
design a competing product. "' 167 Although the court ultimately affirmed the district
court's fmding of infringement, the Federal Circuit, as in Westvaco, wrote of the
positive benefits of designing around and found that the competitor, Smith, did not
willfully infringe. 168 According to the court, "To willfully infringe a patent, the
patent must exist and one must have knowledge of it. A 'patent pending' notice
gives one no knowledge whatsoever." 169
I suggest that to base a finding of no willful infringement on the fact that the
infringed patent did not exist is inconsistent, to say the least, with the role of the
patent system, generally, and the notice function of the patent claim, specifically.
In Westvaco and State Industries, both the district court and the Federal Circuit

164. Id.
165. 751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
166.Id. at 1234.
167. Id. at 1235.
168. See id. at 1235-36.
169. Id. at 1236.
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(upon review) found that the competitor infringed the respective patents-in-suit,
although not willfully. In both cases, the virtues of designing around were
articulated. But there is one important difference between the two cases: the
competitor in Westvaco had access to the patent, particularly the patent claims, it
was attempting to design around. The competitor in State only had access to the
commercial embodiment of the patent. However, this fact did not seem to make a
difference to the court, which is rather odd given the importance the Federal Circuit
has placed on the claim itself. The court has repeatedly asserted that it is the claim,
not the conlln.ercial embodiment, that forms the patentee's property interest. 170
V.

CONCLUSION

My primary concern in this Article is the diminished importance of the patent
claim's notice function. The reasons for this diminishment are two-fold: (1) the
inherent ambiguity oflanguage; and (2) broad judicial discretion on the part of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is perhaps largely due
to the ex parte nature of the patent prosecution process. There is little that can be
done about the limits oflanguage other than for patent prosecutors to exercise more
care in claim drafting. However, there is a great deal that can be done about the
patent application process and the Federal Circuit and district courts' lack of
deference. The United States should adopt a post-grant opposition proceeding,
which will provide greater proprietary and competitive certainty ex ante. A majority
of federal district court judges favor such. In the end, however, to realize the
benefits of an opposition proceeding, the Federal Circuit and district courts must
understand that the PTO's patentability determinations are entitled to greater
deference and, therefore, the court should accordingly narrow its standards of
appellate review.

170. See, e.g., Beny Sterling Corp. v. Pescor Plastics, Inc., 122 F.3d 1452, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("A properly conducted patent analysis, be it for infringement or validity, necessarily
requires construing the patent, and more specifically, the claim."); Zenith Lab., Inc. v. BristolMyers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1994)("As we have repeatedly said, it is error
for a court to compare in its infringement analysis the accused product or process .... The only
proper comparison is with the claims of the patent.").
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APPENDIX

SURVEY

A VIEW FROlvf THE BE:t~CH

In an attempt to gauge what federal district court judges thought about the utility
of an opposition proceeding, I conducted an empirical survey of 726 federal district
court judges. Of the 726 judges to whom I sent a cover letter and a questionnaire,
204 (or 28%) responded. The cover letter explained the structure of an opposition
proceeding without discussing the, advantages or disadvantages of such. The
questionnaire asked each judge the following questions:
1. Have you adjudicated any cases in which the validity of a patent was at
issue? 171
DYes
DNo
la. Ifyes, how many? D Fewer than 3; D Between 3 and 7; o Greater than 7
2. Would you favor the implementation of a pre-issuance (post-grant) proceeding
in patent law, whereby a third party can challenge the patentability of a claimed
invention, before the PTO, in an inter partes proceeding?
A. Thf! Data

Of the 204 federal district court judges who responded to my qut<stionnaire,
ninety-three (or 46%) indicated that they would favor the implementation of a preissuance (post-grant) opposition proceeding; forty-five (or 22%) indicated that they
would oppose the implementation of an opposition proceeding; and sixty-six (or
32%) had no opinion due to "lack of experience" in patent cases or "unfamiliarity"
with the issue. 172

171. In retrospect, a more accumte question would have been, "Have you tried any cases in
which the validity of a patent was at issue?"
172. See infra Figure 1. One empirical study conducted by Lawrence G. Kastriner in 1995
indicated that there is significant support by corpomte patent counsel for an opposition proceeding.
Mr. Kastriner conducted a survey of 65 pa4:nt counsel cutting across the technological spectrum.
Of those 65,42 responded. Of those 42, 90% stated that they would favor a post-grant opposition
proceeding. See Nard, Dejt:rence, Defiance, supra note 20, at 1509 n.111.
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Figure 1
Disfavor Implementation
of an Opposition Proceeding

No Opinion

22%

Favor Implementation
of an Opposition Proceeding

Furthermore, twenty-nine (or 31 %) of the ninety-three judges who favor an
opposition proceeding have adjudicated more than seven patent cases; forty (or
43%) adjudicated between three and seven patent cases; and twenty-four (or 26%)
adjudicated fewer than three patent cases. 173

Figure 2a
Number of Patent Cases Adjudicated by Judges
Who Favor Implementation of an Opposition Proceeding

Greater than 7

31%

43%
Between 3 & 7

173. See Figure 2a.
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Figure 2b
Number of Patent Cases Adjudicated by Judges
Who Disfavor Implementation of an Opposition Proceeding

Between 3 & 7
Greater than 7

31%

49%

20%
Fewer than 3
With respect to the forty-five judges who oppose the implementation of an
opposition proceeding, twenty-two (or 49%) adjudicated more than seven patent
cases; fourteen (or 31%) adjudicated between three and seven patent cases; and
nine (or 20%) adjudicated fewer than three patent cases. 174
B. The Reasons Behind the Data
The judges provided several reasons for why they either favored or disfavored the
implementation of a post-grant opposition proceeding. As to those judges who
favored an opposition proceeding, 175 their reasons can be categorized as follows:
(1) PTO expertise/institutional competence (31%)/ 76 (2) diminution in

174. See Figure 2b.
175. See infra Figure 3.
176. Some representative comments were:
1. "There are few federal judges who are lqlowledgeable and experienced enough
to preside over patent trials. Few of us have a scientific/mechanical background on
the bench. Evidentiary issues are twice as hard for a federal judge as they would be
for a judge with a scientific/mechanical background. We judges are interested in a
just result. I feel most inadequate when I preside over a patent trial because the
subject matter is so foreign to me."
2. "We see so few patent cases, that on the rare occasion when one is filed, it takes
a considerable amount of time to come up to speed. Even so, the highly technical
nature of the issues presented is often very difficult for the average judge to fully
comprehend.''
3. "Prior review by examiners skilled in the pertinent art-considering technical
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litigation/conservation ofjudicial and client resources (46%); 177 (3) interpretive aid
for patentability and claim construction (21%); 178 and (4) other (2%). 179 The
reasons of those judges who disfavored an opposition proceeding180 can be
categorized as follows: (1) abuse/delay (46% ); 181 (2) system works just fme
(24%); 182 (3) additional complexity (21 %)/ 83 and (4) no reason given (9%).

arguments challenging patentability can oniy serve to eliminate (or at least focus)
patent ambiguities lay judges must consider when construing a patent."
4. "The [opposition] procedure would.allow an expert in the PTO to make the initial
determination of many is~es which later arise in c0 urt, a les~ efficient and more
expensive forum."
177. Some representative comments were:
1. "This [opposition procedure] could save litigants money."
2. "Such a procedure might resolve issues at the administrative level, thus
eliminating issues or cases (or perhaps refining the legal arguments) before the
parties get involved in expensive and cumbersome litigation."
3. "This procedure would conserve judicial resources."
4. "I believe proceedings of this sort would likely result in less litigation and fewer
instances in which the district court is compelled to invalidate a patent after it is
issued."
5. "I should think that such a proceeding might serve to obviate protracted and
expensive litigation challenging the validity of a patent after it is issued."
178. Some representative comments were:
1. "Such a prior proceeding might help to better define the patent claims."
2. "[An opposition proceeding] would clarifY what the patent covers and the state of
the art."
3. "[An opposition proceeding] might provide useful guidance for deciding issues of
patentability."
179: For example, some judges qualified their "yes" answer because of appellate review issues,
namely their concern with respect to broad standards of review.
180: See infra Figure 4.
181. Some representative comments were:
1. "The opposition proceeding is subject to abusive use for purposes of delay and
harassment."
2. "[An opposition proceeding] would do nothing but further delay issuance of
patents. A pre-issuance disclosure would probably cause mischief discouraging
applications."
3. "Such a proceeding would further slow down the Patent Office, which is already
understaffed and swamped."
·
4. "I have sufficientfaith In the expertise of the patent examiners and very little faith
in the honesty of competitors who would contrive evidence at an early stage."
182. Some representative comments were:
1. "A sufficient level of scrutiny already exists. An additional procedural hurdle to
patentability is both unnecessary and potentially expensive to the patentee."
2. ''[An opposition proceeding] isn't needed."
3. "The present system seems to work very well." .
4. "The process works fine as now in place."
183. Some representative comments were:
1. "The system needs to be simplified; not another layer of administrative overload
and expense. Let the system work."
2. "It would add just ano_!:her level oflitigation."
3. "[An opposition proceeding] would add more confusion to an already complicated
process."
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Figure 3
Reasons for Favoring Implementation of an

Opposition Proceeding
Interpretive Aid For Patentability
and Claim Construction

PTO Expertise/
Institutional Competence

Other

2%

Diminution In Litigation/Conservation
of Judicial and Client Resources
.,.

Figure 4

Reasons for Disfavoring Implementation
of an Opposition Proceeding
No Reason Given
System Works Just Fine

9%

24%

Additional Complexity

46%
Abuse/Delay

